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Vor.. XLIV. APRIL, 1900. No. " G O .  
[A rcfkors alone ore rqbonsiblr /or fhe confenfs of fkeir rcspccfiz~e Papers.] 
_ _ _ _ ~ -  
I XI '  1iO1) U C1'0 RY R E 31 A 1i 6s. 
'1'0 tlccidc correctly as to tlic type of ship best adaptctl for n givcti 
piirposc, it  is licccssary to bcgin by consitlcring the nature of tlic work 
that wil l  bc rcqitircd of hcr in carrying this purposc into cffcct. A 
dcfinitc litic of naval policy sli.'oiild, thercforc, bc determined on by any 
coiiiitry holding aspirations to powcr on tlic scas, as thc basis 011 ivliich 
to ivork iii building its ships of \Far. 
For couiitrics aitiiing at tlic dcfcricc of thcir coast-liiic ;and tc,rri- 
torial possostioiis oiily, t l i cx  ships \rill meet thcir rcquirciiieiits, i f  
coiistructctl for coast deleiicc purc and simple, without high sea-going 
qualities. For 0 t h  countries, restricted for various rcasbiis iri t h i r  
cspetitliture, it is only possible to undertake the construction of tlic 
clicaper fornis of naval dcfciice, which lic in tnrpcdo-boats, ctc. For .  
oiir owi country, however, the first of tlicse objccts i.5 insufticicIit for t h ~  
1i;itioiial csistcnce aiid wlfarc:; and w e  arc, fortunately, in  a positiotl 
\diich liccs 115 from the Iiniit:ttions of the sccond. 'Hic defcncc of ou'r 
tcrritory a u c I  coasts Iron1 invasion is only a pait of the \rork requiring to 
bc carried out by the S a y  ; for, if thc eas themseIrcs cannot actually be 
cnllcd British territory, more than lia f f the traflic they carry is British 
property, \vliich I i i u s t  also be secured at all costs froin tnoleslation by ; ~ l  
VOL. XLIV. Y 
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GOLD JIEDAI. PRIZE ESS.IY. 361 
I t  ivould, lion-ever, probably bc correct to say that it was as much tlic 
effort to obtain tlic resisting powers produced by tlic ability to carry 
armoiir, as the offcnsivc powers obtained by the most effective disposition 
of guns, mhich by degrecs modified ships to ttic types of the prescnt 
day; and, as the increascd eflicacy of arinour has been arrived a t  morc 
from tlic results of a series of succcssful espcrimcnts and discoverics- 
which may be indcfinitcly continncd-in the chemical trcatmcnt of 
materials during the process of manufacture, than from any merely 
nicclianical improvement of design, i t  is impossible to assert that the 
Im-scntly accepted typc of ship iv i l l  not be quitc obsolctc twenty years 
Iicncc. 
I t  Iiappcns to be thc cxc ,  Iiowcvcr, that, bcsidcs the direct power 
of offence and defence. wlicn actually in the prescnce of an enemy's 
battle-fleets, wliicli is tlic attribute of primary iniportaiicc, a Navy has 
otlicr requisites to bc consitlcred. I t  ought .also to possess tlie inherent 
faculty of applyitig tliesc forccs at  tlie riglit moments, by being ablc to 
rcly upon its own abilities to reconnoitre and acquire information of 
strategical and tactical value ; aiid, lastly, it ought to be able to protect its 
own mercantile marinc from the lcsscr operations of an  cncniy in a purely 
commerce-destroying line. Thcsc requirements necessitate the construction 
of a class of vessel in which speed must bc the  paramount object ; and 
thus originated tlic frigate of 'former times and the cruiscr of to-day. 
Tlic cruiscr, therefore, is the sccond ncccssity of a fleet as at present 
constituted, and coniplcnicntary to the batt leship in forming the 
\vholc. 
As a uscfiil auxiliary, although not a necessity .to a flcct, conics tlie 
typc of sniall craft spcci;illy built to utilisc thc n'liitehcad or other 
locomotive torpedo, \diicli has come into csistencc as a direct result of 
thc invcntioii of these wnpons .  Broadly spcaking, this class includes 
torpedo-cruisers, tcrpcdo-gunboats, - dcstroycrs, and torpedo-boats. 
IWIi thcni, as with the cruiscr, spccd ,is alniost everything, bot in their 
casc mainly as a nicaiis of enabling them to get, unobserved or 
undamaged, within cffectivc rangc of tlicir torpedoes. This gcncral 
class, however, is practically limited in its operations to coast and 
harbour defence. work, and cannot, to any great cstcnt, be instrumental 
i n  framing the strategy of a war connected ivith tlic object of obtaining 
command, of thc sea, although they xiiny modify its conduct to sonic 
est en t. 
1 hcsc thrcc general typcs, thcii, form the elements of nil coin- 
plctclg and properly constituted fleets of tlic prescnt day, al~hoiigli their 
rcspcctivc numerical proportions arc varied accordingly as each typc 
happcns to bc more or iehs rcquircd by tlic vnriorid naval policies of 
d i ffercn t count rics . 
The iiidivitlual duties in war of ,the tlircc typcs arc-fairly clearly 
tlcfincd, and tlic ,differentiation of the ~ypcs  slioultl therefore be distinct 
in tlicory, but i s  a matter of fact this is far from bciiirg tIic C;ISC, from a 
variety of causes: Thcre arc cruisers aflost which are almost battle-ships, 
and so-called battlc-ships \vliicli iirc little morc than cruisers, and ;i very 
,. 
Y 2. 
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360 GOLI) MED:\I, PRIZE ESSAY'. 
iiidcfinitc line csists between the sniallcr cruisers and tlic larger torpedo- 
gunboats. This is detrimcntal in many ways to gcncral cfliciency, for 
tlicre can be 110 qucstion that Iioiiiogcncity in  cnch type 'gives a fleet 
posscssing it iiiiniense advantagcs. . I f  thc battle-ships of a fleet haw tlic 
s u n e  spced and niantcuvring capabilities, their conibincd nicnuiiciits arc 
greatly facilitntcd ; i f  its cruisers havc tlic s a ~ n c  coal stowagc antl s p e d  
in n sea-way, tlic)' can act i n  conjunction without hampering cach otlicr ; 
if tlic artillery has uniform power it can all be brought into action at its 
niost cKcctivc range, and so on. As regards ammunition, tlic desiral~ility 
of liccping the number of diflkrcnt d i b r c s  a t  :I n i i~~ i in i~n i~nus t  be obvious. 
Accepting tlie fdct, Iioivcvcr, that sonic class or anotlicr of sea-goiiig 
battle-ships and cruisers, assistcd by smaller torpcdo craft, iiiust provide tlic 
rcquisitc clcrncnts of force rcqdrcd to carry out thc nationnl policy at sea, 
it bcconies expedient to csnmine carefully tlic points which, wlicn coiii- 
bincd, go to produce tlie most cffcctivc pattern of a ship of each class. 
1 lic conditions laid cto\vii for tlic cssay statc that the cxpcrienccs 
gaiiied by thc results of the China-Japanesc antl Spanish-American wars 
arc to be called in, to assist in arriving at opinions ; but altliougli there 
are valuable lessons to bc dcrived from cach, sometimcs of R I ~ C W  
clraracter, yct care niust be cscrciscd in taking thcsc as leading to con- 
clusivc or infallible dcdactions. In thc first place, tlic flccts 011 the 
vanquished side in cach case ncre lnbourjng undcr the tlisadvaritagcs of n 
gross inaladniinistratioii, which let1 to neglect and depreciation of iiin/i,-iJ, 
ant1 to incficiency and incapacity of /wrsoiind. Secondly, tlieir tactics 
if tlicy had any dcfinitc purppsc in  tlicni at all, wcrc of thc poorcst dcscrip- 
tion, while tlieir gcncrd stratcgy antl idcns of conibination can only be 
described as absolotcly fatuous. In spitc of tliis, Iio\vcver, some warnings 
of n most uniiiistal;nblc~iaturc arc prescntcd ; and thc writer, Izcping thcsc 
in \;icw, proposcs to consider now each type successively in ordcr of 
],rcccdcncc as regards their rcspcctivc po\vcr, coninicncing tlicrcforc with 
tlic 1)attlc-sliip. 
, *  
PA lYI* I .--U.\T.I.I.E-S I I I 11s. 
As far.as tlic ivritcr's vic\vs go, a battlc-slip for our o\\m Scrvicc 
sliodd bc constructed to nicct thc follo\viiig reqirircniciits ill tlic scqucncc 
,"IVCll :- 
t r .  Sca\vorthiiicss. 
b. Large calibrc gun powcr. 
c. I'rotection. 
tZ. Speed. 
6'. Coal stowge. 
f. Medium antl light calibrc gun power. 
g. Rain and torpedo poivcr, 
And tliis ordcr has bccii arrivcd at for thc-rc%soiis i i o ~  to bc sIio\vn. 
(z. Sr~n~c~o~/lri~rcss.-To anyoiic who admits that thc coiiditioiis or 
the Empirc imperatively rlcniand that thc seas sliall bc kept clear of an 
cneliiy's ships, i t  is probably quite IiIiiiccessary to argue that this quality 
iliust mist  above all tliings in Kritisli sliips of war, because it is cvidciit 
tllat to kccp an cncmy oiT tlic seas yon must bc ablc to 1;ccp on thcin 
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GOLD 3IEDAL PRIZE ESSXT. 3G3 
yourself. Sea\yorthincss in a fighting-ship, for this reason, should com- 
prise not mcrcly the p o w r  to rcmain safely at  sea during any wcathcr, 
but, i f  possible, thc powcr to use sonic at  lcast of hcr weapons cffcctivcly 
i n  any wcatlicr. TO providc for this, shc should carry hcr guns at a good 
height abovc the water, and on a stcndy platform. These two tlcrnnntis 
work against cach other somc\vIiat, as clcvation of weights produces 
reduction of stability; but that tlicy can Ije combincd is provctl by 
tIic pcrformaiiccs of our liiojt rccciit classcs of battle-ships, which in 
this respect arc ackno\vlcdgcd to havc no rivals. I t  has bccn tlenion- 
striitctl rcpcatcdly by practical cspcricnce that bilgc kccls are a great 
llclp tonards reducing the motion of a ship, and although they do 
pcrlraps tend slightly to detract from spcctl, tlicir stcatlying clfects more 
than compcnsatc for it. A high frcc-board and forward “ shecr,” or a 
rnisctl forecastle, assist a \rCsjel greatly, of course, in stcaniing liead to 
wind, and tlicsc fcatrircs arc to bc found i n  most of oiir later types of 
all classes. In fact, tlicrc can be no doubt that as good all-round sea 
boats tlic ships built of recent ycars for our Service have no cqrials in any 
other, and as suc~i  t hc j  will be takcn in this essay as the typbs bcst suited 
011 that particular point for our needs. 
6, Lnr-gc CnliCn, G I ~ I I  P ~ i ~ ~ c * ~ . - l n  the possession of hcavy calibre 
artiliery, ant1 consequently increased offensive p o w r  i n  R conccntraictl 
form, miist lie the cliicf distinction between thc battle-ship and the 
criiiscr. Unfortunately on this very point the lesson of the tno  wars in 
question teach 11s wry little of a positive valuc. Indccd, they might sceni 
to suggest that tlic day of tlic hcavy gun is past in favour of the mctliuni 
or l ig~i t  (~~‘iic~i-firer, bccaiisc at  Santiago tIic fourtceri guns in a11 of 
19-inch and 13.5-inch calibre carried by thc American battle-ships only 
succcedcd in getting liomc twice, to whatever this may have bccn 
attributable; but thc Amcricans had an easy task, as they w r c  only 
engaged with cruisers for nhosc poivcrs of resistance thc lighter Q.1:. 
guns were more than a match, IIad tlic Spanish vcsscls heen first-class 
battle-ships, tlrc action would probably have bccn decided ultimately by 
the hcavy ordriancc of onc side or the other. 
Thc  apparently negative rcsults again of the large cspenditure of 
Iicavy calibre ammunition on both sides at tlic \‘ah do  not tiisprovc thc 
gcneral axiom, whilc the state of tlic Chinese battle-ships after the 
engagement indirectly hclps us  to accept . it.  The writer was informed 
bj an English olGccr, who was on board die “ Ting Yucn,” that neither 
slic nor her sister ship Iiatl rcccivetl any scrioiis damage tliroiighout, 
altliougli’riddled by Q.F. guns in thcir unprotected parts ; and but for 
the fact that their magazines were nearly empty, a n h .  their c rew much 
rccluccd, t~icy were practicall; just as cnicicnt for figlitink purposcs at t ~ i c  
close of the action, after five hours’ hamnicring, as they wcrc at  the 
bcginning, because no Iicavy shell had struck a vital part. Apart from tlic 
iisc of ram or torpcdo, tlicrcforc, or the chance of firc breaking oat, it is 
obvious that such vessels are only to be finally put out of action bx pro- 
jectiles which can bc driven home anywhere ; arid ships built to tnatcli 
them mrist tlicrcforc, as a mnttcr of necessity, carry hcavy guns for the 
purposc. 
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364 Gorm IIRDAT. m i z E  ESS.\T. 
There seems at  present howcvcr to be a somediat  general consciisus 
of opinion that guns can bc too hcavy as ivell as too light, and that a 
certain medium is the bcst. The rccent cspcricnccs of thc very heavily 
armed American battle-ships in bad ivcathcr appeared to shoiv that they 
were doubtfully sca\vorthy through shccr ovcrn-cighting, and this wi th  
pcrhaps additional rcasons has induced the Anicricans to modify the sizc 
of their largest types, in much the same nianncr as we have done. l'lic 
last report of the United Stntcs Rtircau of Saval Ordnancc 'contains 
amongst others the following rcmnrks : ". . . heavy giins in turrets must 
be rccognised as a necessity, but the question as to the. calibre to be 
employed is a subject for serious consideration, and one upon icliicli the 
13urcaii lias bcstnned much thouglit. ." " Development of the 12-iiich 
gun lias becn so great, and its power so much incrcasctl, tliat tlic Bureau 
is of opinion that hcrcafter it will be the niasiinuin calibre ; that it will be 
advisable to install tlicni on future battlc-ships, and that tlicsc sliould be 
supplemented by an auxiliary battery of 6-inch Q.F. guns, i n  cascniatcs, 
ctc." 
If this opinion is sotinil, our rcccntly built bnttlc-ships are probably 
the bcst cquippcd in the world, for !hc 12-inch \vim gun of our latcst 
design is a weapon of very superior power, whilc not undcsirably heavy, 
nnd the present pattern of mounting is strong, cnsily handlcd, and as 
simple as can be cspccted. 
I t  is truc that the Americans arc much in favour of electrically worked 
mountings, and tlicsc may pcrliaps have advantages, .especially as regards 
repairing facilities ; but on the other hand, the repeatct1"referciiccs to the 
failure of electric hoists, ctc., in tlic reports of their onn  ofhers after the 
ivar, constitute a &y noticca1)lc fact; and until n.c Iiavc more experience 
of our own to go upon, electricity is not considered here as Iiavingsunicicnt 
argrinients in its favour to sripcrscdc'liydraulic motive power altogctlicr. 
Our system of  disposing guns i n  pairs in two harbettcs, instcad . .  of 
singly in fours, saves a great deal i n  iveight and duplication of machinery, 
and a clear proof that its advantages arc rccognised lies in the fact that 
almost all foreign Poners are gradually following oiir lcatl in the matter. 
This, therefore, as it stands is the typc of heavy armament which the 
nritcr would select as best a d a p e d  to a British battle-ship. 
Av/rdio,r.--d defeated shi~;. is one that has beer1 incapcitatcd 
from further on'ensivc action, for the time bciiig at any rate. This is the 
consummation licr cncmy.must cndcavour to reach throughout, and, pro- 
vided shc fights on as long as sl!c has thc poncr, can only bc. accom- 
plislicd by rendering hcr ivcnpons useless or sinking hcr outright. Thc 
former may be cn'cctcd either by, causing tlircct damage to the wapons  
tlicmsclves, paralysing loss to tlic -creiv'whicli handles them, or fruitless 
exhaustion of their ammunition. Daniage to- her machinery or steering 
arrangements is only a step to this end, although one of the surest that 
can be taken, for it leaves her at such a disadvantage that the rejt is 
rendered an easy matter. 
Nest, therefore, to having the p o w r  of inflicting these injuries 
on .an opponent, a battle-ship shosld be so constructed as to prevent 
. 
c. 
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GOLD JIEIJ . \ I .  I ~ I < I Z I :  i:ss.\v. 31;s 
tlicm from bciiig inflicted on herself. Her own'giins, by supplying her 
with an " offcnsivc defence," act  partly tomrds  this, but are not all- 
sufficient for the piirposc. Armour-plating of some sort ouglit to form 
part of hcr equipment, and the immunity from serious damage to 
t~in/t!i-id experienced by die Chinese ships already referred to, is only one 
of many instances which go to prove its great value i n  prcserving a 
vesscl's offensive powers in action. ' 
In t!iis particular case, Iiowewr, its location was such that it was only 
equal to preserving them in part, for the crews sufercd heavily, nhich in 
conjunction with the fzilurc of ammunition forced tlie ships to retreat 
beaten to Port hrtliiir. In  other words, they wcrc defeated ships, althougli 
neither sunk nor even materially injured on tlic water-line, because their 
weapons had been rcntlcrcd ineffective,' antl they were co~iscqucntly in 
such a condition that they \voultl have fnllcn an easy prej- Iiatl the ivinncrs 
chosen to follow up their succcss. 
Altliough 
with water-lines practically untouclicd the Spanish cruisers were driven 
ashore as diattercd wrccks, the primary causc of tlcfcat arising froin the 
tlcniornlising loss to the human clcinent in their cquipments. 'I'lresc are 
etcnts calling for close attention. 
Tlic chief, and unavoidable, drawhack to arnio~ir, scvercly restricting 
its use on floating structures, is its great \vciglit. This restriction renders 
it a niattcr of tlic utmost importance, so to distribute it, that the protcc- 
tion anbrtletl may be given whcrc most ncetlcd, or it wili be a dmd 1o::d 
cacurnbcring the ,ship nntl detracting from licr c-llicic-ncv. I3rimIl.v 
speaking, it lins been. customary hitherto to place it ovcr tlie water-line 
first-in belted crtiiscrs often there only-aid then, i f  die ship could 
carry it, ovcr thc arninnient and spaces occupied (luring action hcr 
crew. This indicated a prciailing idch that a ship WJS in inore danger 
of succumbing to bloivs on the, former than on thc latter; but \vhethcr 
this notion was or was not iii accortlance with fact in the past, it can 
scarcely bc considered as othcr\visc than crroncoiis i n  the present. The  
American report and analysis of the action at Manila conclridcs with the 
very notenorthy ciprcssion of opiriion that ships are more likely i n  the 
future to suffer defeat through loss in p ~ r s o i ~ i ~ d  than from damagc to '  
7i/tZ/t!rh/, which the general results of the war,sccni fully to bcar'out. 
\VitIi this before us, we are constrainetl to admit, that the \vIioIc 
question of the value o f  watcr-line protection, relatively to otlicr pro- 
tection, is raised, antl rcquircs most carcfd and unprejudiced scrutiny. In  
the first place, \v,e have the undoubted fact that tlic watcr-line of a ship is 
the most diflicult thiiig of gill to hit, and a vcri triflini error in range, antl 
consequent clcvation will cause a miss in ,the attempt.' Moreover, if tlic 
error lie i n  an under-cstiination of tlic rangc, the projcctile will fall short 
and, except for a chance ricochet, will miss the enemy altogether. 'rliis, 
i f  persisted in, niiist Icad to n useless waste of ammunition, and, when 
quick-firers are at work on both sides, of very valuablc time, for thc 
enemy Iiiiglit already t )c getting i n  decisivc work by concentrating his 
attack on the easier a i d  perhaps niorc ~viilnerA)lc target oflerctl by the 
At Santiago again ive see a recurrence of the same thing. 
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3GG GOLD BIEDAI. P R I Z E  ESS.\V. 
other’s battery and sidcs. Captain Nahan, i n  his article in tlic T i m s  of 
1st Xarch, 1899, remarks that war cannot bc made without taking risks, 
of which the greatest is niisplaccd or esaggeratcd carefulncss.!’ If 
armour thick cnougli almost to resist the impact of any sized projectile is 
piled lip along a vcssol’s water-line as hitherto,The plating which covers 
men and guns must be restricted ; or, in other words, the thing which 
seems least IikeIi to suffer i n  action \rill rcccive protection at  the espensc 
of that ivhicli is likely to suffer the most. 
This seems at least open to question, whethcr, in such a casc, this 
vcry risk of misplaced or craggerated carefulness” is not incurred, 
tlie ansicty to render A ship unsinkable causing an oinission of the 
nccessnry steps to provide against, Iicr defeat in other ways pcrhaps 
more easily accomplished. It is, of course, true that a si71g/e blon. on 
the water-line, whcn the projectilc is hcavp cnougli, must, as a rule, 
cause a more serious injury than a sir& blow on the upper \!orbs, I)ut 
not more so, than a rapid succession of them, and, as it is infinitcly less 
probable, should be guarded against jast. 
At Santiago, tlic :Imcricaiis fired scores of rounds from their heavy 
12-  and 13-.inch turrct-guns, and only hit tlic Spaniards twice altogether 
wi th  th:it class of \vcapon. I t  i s  quite possible that this may havc bcdi 
tIuc: to slicer I)ad giinncry, but evcii an iinprovcmcnt of tent. per cent. 
in the practice woultl only give four hits all told. If, tlicn,‘ scorcs of 
rorinds arc rcquirctl to get four hits on four ships, or a11 avcragc of 
one apiccc on tlic t:irgct presented by the ship’s whole side, it would 
bc hecessary to espcnd hundreds to make sure of cvcntually landing 
011 h@r watcr-line. 
To the writer, therefore, it ccrtainly appcars that the risk of sink- 
ing or disabling a ship in this \ray is of so remote a naturc that mc should 
bc justified in rcducing the thickness antl w i g h t  of water-line 
belting, for the sake of thc.urgcnt ncccssity now arising of giving better 
protection elsewhere. Wc arc constantly bcing told that R battle-ship must 
always be a compromise, t5 some extent at Ica3t ; and this secnis to 
be the arrangement by which the ship will suffcr least from the 
sacrifices which thc compromise dcmands. The heavy water-line bclts 
which the Spanish cruisers carricd were of no hvbil in saving them 
from rajid and cffectual destruction by the fire of medium and light 
batteries. Had the hundreds of tons of what proved to be 11 elcss 
arniour been employed i n ,  sheltering their incii ruid guns, the : B ction 
might, at any rate, Iiave been greatly prolonged. 
If, hoivever, it inust bc admitted that the clianccs ,of a heavy shell 
striking just between wind antl water arc vcry rcmote, as regards the 
lighter projectiles, this does not hold-goed on account of thcir mere 
ntinibers. \\‘hen a modern action is in full swing, the ships engaged 
are csposed to a perfect hail of the latter: and, although thcy Can- 
not, except by estraordinary luck, cffcct serious damage whcn there is 
anything of R protcctive dccl;, they may still flood compartments above 
it, and caiisc much trouble in other ways. On the strength of thi:, 
qiid as a mean between the oppositc cxtrenies of opinion on thc 
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subject, the writer \vould suggest that a belt of .I- or 5-inch plating 
is all that appears to be practically necessary, thickened only, if it  
must be so, just abreast the machinery. Such a belt would resist thc 
impact of chance light projectiles, and the very great saving of weight 
might be applied to thickening tlic armoiir on the sides, casemates, 
and gun-shields, etc.-in fact, to all parts which esperieiicc now 
seeins to point out as those on which the brunt of the enemy's 
tlcstructiw +forts will fall. 
But if the risks to which thc water-line is esposed are apparently 
small, those incurred by the guns a!id thcir crews arc undoubtedly 
very great, and, as 'they form the niost irnportant part of a ship's 
offensive power, tliey cannot have too much protcction, provided 
always the ship can carry the weight. This, of course, also applies 
to the  aniiniinitioii-suppIying arrangements and the inen working them, 
without which the guns are useless. 
As regards, then, the safety of the heavy guns and their mountings 
and mechanism, the system of steel hoods over arniouretI barbettcs, as 
iiscd in al l  our most recent IxtttIe-ships, seems, as far as the writer is 
capable of judging, tG be the best that can be devised ; antl ;I 10-inch 
jiootl OVCJ n 12-incIi Iirlipp steel-plated barbcttc ouglit-since thc 
face-liardcningr processes h a w  been suc~essfully carried out with heavy 
as ivcll as niccliuin arniour-to bc quite sunicicnt for the purpose, rcprc- 
sentiiig as that \voiiltl, approximately, tncnty-fire ant1 thirty inches of 
a-rouglit-i ron protvctioii. 
The protcction of thc inetlium antl light calibrc Q.1:. batteries should 
1)ropcrly lie referred to after the subject of medium calibre gun p o w r  
wliicli conics Intcr, as  it^ is considered of sccondnry importance to the gulls 
themselves, on thc principle already given as embodying the writer's views. 
As it is desirable, Iiorvever, to simp!ify discussion by completing the 
treatment of each subject as a \rholc,-it \rill be .dealt with here. . Briefly, 
it may be said, that when the penetrating po\i*ers of modern medium calibre 
ortlnancc as used now by all nations are considered, the secontlari bat- 
teries of any vcsscl ranking as a first-class battle-ship, together wit11 their 
arraiigenicnts for supplying ammunition, and the men workingthem, should 
be sheltered by at least eight inches of Harveyizetl steel. \\'it11 Iirupp 
steel this might bc sliglitl! reduced, and with either could be carried by 
thinning the water-Iiiic belt. 
Bcsitlcs, hoircvcr, the direct protection afforded by armour-plating, 
there is a spcclcs of indircct protection ivhich can be provided in a ship, 
especially to tlic hliiiian element in her equipment, by ensuring the absence 
of materials which nixy assist the eiiemy by adding to the destructive effect 
of his projectiles. 
This is a lesson which m s  enforced with tremendous emphasis in both 
the wars whicll form the subject of study, but nhicli seems almost entirely 
to have escaped notice, although anyone reading the accounts of the 
effects of the shell fire on light upper works, etc., can hardly fail to remark 
it. At present, however, ships are built all over the world in whose 
designs this most important point is entirely ignored, and rvliose decks arc 
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368 COLD N ~ l ) . l I ,  PItIZE ESSAY. 
covered with a niass of pcrnianenr supc+xctural  fittings, all constructed 
of splinterable and, in some cases, inflammable, material, whicli arc of 
little or no use escept as conveniences in peace-timc. The  permanent 
nature of their construction might very easily be remedied by replacing the 
rivets, ctc., by nuts and bolts; but this is never done, and the great majority 
of esisting ships, if called upon to engage to-morrow, would therefore go 
into action I\ it11 their fighting efficiency heavily handicapped by this fact. 
I n  most cruisers it would be almost impossible for a shell to pass over tlie 
deck at any height under ten feet without encountering sonic obstacle that 
would imrnediatcly fly in*o splinters. The hatchway combings are now 
developed into bulkheads estcnding often eight or nine feet upnards, 
enclosing nothing in particular, and merely forming ventilating trunks ; 
the so-called “ shelter ” decks and platforms are erected only as extra 
promenading spaces, or places for sto\vage of gear nhich would be much 
better below; while almost a11 ships have tuo, and some even thiee, 
bridges fornard, besides a couple aft. In  addition to all these, there are 
cabins, chart-houses, hammock nettings, and boxes, bins, and a host of 
other fittings placed everywhere, and the gangways in many ships are 
covered ovzrhead with a number of girders, crutches, and skids for catry- 
ing boats when turned in. Many of these fittings are practically super- 
fluous ; all of them arc detrimental to fighting cfiicicncy, nntl sliould, in 
the writer’s opinion, as based on tlie light of the esperiences afforded by 
these wars, be so fitted that, on the outbreak of hostilities, they could be 
removed by the ship’s artificers, and either left at a base, or thrown over- 
board altogether. Haninioclis could always be stowed belo\\-, or, during 
peace, in removable boxes on deck, and the  usual fixed steel nettings 
replaced by rails and weather screens. Ventilation is, of course, a most 
necessary thing, but ventilating trunks are a source of tlanger in action, 
and should be removable. T h e  same thing applies to seamen’s heatls, 
latrines, and w.c.’s. Sanitary considerations require that these should be 
placedon drck, buttliereshould benoconstructional tlifficultyin makingtheni 
also removable, and substituting some armngenicnts of canvas screens on 
a light framc\\orl;. One bridge, of a light flying design, for convenience 
in peace time, or even \rliile merely cruising in nar, ought to be suficient 
for the conning of any ship, if properly placed. 
As regards boats, it  appcars that the Americans left them nearly all 
at  the  base, and judging by the complete destruction of tliosc retained on 
board, they were probably right in doing so. If the boats are not 
required, then neither are their fittings on board the ship, and especially in 
some classes of cruisers. A great mass of steel and \i oodv ork immetliately 
over tlie waist guns could he got rid of ~ i t h  advantage. All these could 
be easily constructed in sets of removable piece?. 
The same arguments npply to many fittings between decks, but per- 
haps-to a lesser estent, because a shell in those parts will, as a rule, have 
been already exploded unavoidably by passing through the side. 3Iucli 
inflammable material, however, is still found below in nearly all ships, and 
a good deal of it in the shape of permanent fittings and furniture. If 
ordinary japanned tin, such as is used in the manufacture of uniform cases, 
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ctc., was substituted for varnished or polishcd wood\vork, thc risk of fire 
\vould bc much reduced. 
Fixed \voodcn decks are another soiircc of danger, cycn wlicn hard 
wood such as teak is usccl, for it n’as clcarly proved at  the I‘alu that the 
nawc momentary graze of a passing projectile caused suficiciit friction to 
set it smoultlcring freely at oiicc. Steel decks arc nnsightly, but appear- 
mccs  arc absolutely tlie last things to bc consitlcrctl in a ship built for 
practical work, and should never be allowccl to interfere with clliciency. 
In the writer’s opinion, the warning against putting ~ o o d  or dangerous 
material intp a ship is one of the most conspicuous lessons of these wars, 
and we should, consequently, so design all fittings about the tlccks not 
inimctliatcly requircd that thcy can be rcmovcd at  short notice with thc 
ship’s o w  rcsourccs. If, when clcared for action, slic sho\ved nothing 
above thc .  Icvcl of her Iiatch\vay conibiiigs except funnels, masts. guns, 
and conning tower, a very appreciable percentage of the shon-cr of 
projectiles intended by an enciny for her benefit would fly harinlcssly 
across hcr dcck, instead of, as in the case of Ccrvcra’s cruisers, causing 
loss and tlenioralisation to her men. 
‘I’o summarise, thcrcforc, what ‘the idcas of this essay would s q g e s t  
as to the protective arrangements best adapted for a battle-ship of our 
Service, she should carry ten or tivelve inches pf carburised or othcnvise 
specially treated steel ovcrbhcr heavy armament and all its appurtenances; 
if possible, at lcas! eight inches ovcr her secondary arnianicnt, central 
supplies, etc ; all guns of 4.7 calibre or upwards being caseniated ; and a 
conipletc ikiter-line belt of 4- or 5-inch plating tloublcd immediately 
abreast the machinery ; and if the total w i g h t  of such proved more than 
a designer coiild work in, the rediiction should first be madc on the 
\vatcr-liiic, on the thesis here advanced, that experience now slioiis this 
to be tlie region where it is least requircd. 
In addition to this, she slioultl carry the usual ;?-inch steel dcck 
2nd a I-inch deck above the citadel, but not necessarily prolonged from 
thence to the estreinitics of the ship, as in some late designs. 
Further, slic should be so constructed that all fittings above and 
belo\\- of such a nature as to be likely to increase the cffect of slicll fire 
should be easily removable unless absolutcly necessary in action. 
Two 10-inch plated, conning to\vcrs, fairly ivcll separated, rvould 
also be included, and some form of protection, at least shell and splinter 
proof, round thc funnels below the upper deck. 
Spscd.--Tliat niotivc powers of some sort are ncccssary to a ship 
goes without saying, and, as a imtssi!y, this possession, in a greater or 
lesser dcgrcc, is only secondary to thc possession of giinpondcr, for 
without them she ~voultl be of no value except as a sort of fixed defence, 
and of hardly any at that. But it has been takcii for grantcd by the 
writer that nobody is lilicly to argue against this, and by placing “speed” 
as the fourth requisite for a battle-ship, it is inearit to infer gdo(f  speed- 
that is, a speed of not less than eighteen knots. By high speed, in 
distinction to god, as dealt with later, a speed of over eighteen knots is 
incant. 
(1. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 A
riz
on
a] 
at 
23
:38
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
370 GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESS.‘LY. 
Good speed is an attribute of very grcat importance to any ship. To 
cruisers and torpedo craft high speed is a first essential, and if of com- 
paratively lesser moment to a battle-ship it is only because it does not in 
itself materially contribute towards the actual destruction of an enemy’s 
htt lc-ships wlicn she is once within range, pnless, perhaps, on the very 
rare occasions \\hen ramming may be resorted to. Captain Mahan, in 
his article to the T~T~IC-S, published 1st l larch,  1S99, remarks on this in 
the follo\ving words :-‘‘ With the battle-ship, in this contrary to the 
cruiser, offensive power is the dominant feature. While, therefore, speed 
is desirable to it, excessive specd is not admissible if, as. the writer 
bclieies, it can be obtained only at some sacrifice of offensive strength.” 
If speed does not increase offensive polver hoivever, it does almost 
everything else. When superior to an enemy’s, it enables the posscssoi 
to bring him nithin range, and keep him there, whatever ’ie may attempt 
to the contrary. I t  gives the option, in other words, of fJrcing or declin- 
ng action, and is the foundation on nhich all stratcgical plans and coni- 
binations niiist bc framed and carricd out. I t  is the essence of the so- 
called “ Fleet in Being,” that is to say, it may paralyse the prosecution of 
an over-sea war, by preventing the aggressive belligerent from cfecting 
the necessary iniiial step, of tlestroyjng the defender’s ships. Finally, in 
action, it enables a ,flag officer or captain to mike the best use of every 
kind of weapon he has. I t  is not hoivever a weapon in itself, as prcvi- 
ously remarked ; nor docs it act much towards the preservation of a vcsscl’s 
poacrs while they arc cmploycd in the offensive, as armour does, and 
thcrcforc it must rank aftcr ordnancc and arnioiir as a feature in the 
battle-ship. 
The speed of a ship is dependent partly on licr under-water shape, 
and partly on the driving force of her propellers. The shapes which best 
adapt thcniseIves to the water, arc fairly ivell known to designers, and 
roughly speaking, arc those in which the length is great in proportion to 
the arc3 of the midship section, and in \thich the midship scction is only 
carried over a short proportion of that length ; in other words, ivherc 
there is a fine ‘‘ entry” and a fine “run.-” When speed is the first and 
only requirement, therefore, it is not dificult to obtain. But it so happcns 
that, speaking generally, the best shapes forbensuring speed arc just those 
most deficient in buoyancy, or carrying power, in proportion to sizc ; and 
as great buopincy is a sine puri noit in the design of a battle-ship, to enable 
her to carry her enormous load of ordnancc and arniour, on or other, or 
both, of these conflicting qualities must be modified. and tr ie best com- 
promise within reach effected. That hoivci er, is a matter of detail for 
designers, only‘to be arrived at  by prolongecf calculation and espcrinient, 
and forming too lengthya subject for full treatment here. It will only be 
said, that the object to be arrived at in a battle-ship should be the pro- 
duction of a type capable of carrying the heavy weights necessary for 
high belligerent power at  a spced of 18 knots at  least, and this can only 
be attained by building wry  large ships similar to the “ Forinidable ” 
class, 
i 
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As rcgards niacliincry, the iiivcrtetl triple-cspansion type 0 1  c i i ~ '  'IIlCS 
stands at prcscnt as the accc1)tcd pattcrn, without -a  rival for a11 Iargc 
sliips, and nothing furtlicr will be mentioncd on that point hcre, as it will 
I)resumably hold tliis position until somc bcttcr dcsign is forthcoming. 
Ijoilcrs, Iioivcvcr, arc now passing through a very radical change, oiving 
to the gradual abnndonnicnt of the cylindrical in  favour of tlic water-tub? 
vLlricty, by which. amongst otlicr advantagcs, ;I rise in prcssurc from 155 
to 300 11)s. has bccii obtained. \\'atcr-tiibc boilers arc so ivcll adaptcd i n  
many othcr ways for 'ivarlikc purposes, such as rapidity i l l  raising steam, 
much greater facilitics in rcpairiiig damages, coiiiparativcly small dcstruc- 
tivc propertics if hit by a projectile, lightness, etc., that thcrc caii bc 
no qiicstion now of their suitability to a battle-ship. 'I'iicir only draw- 
back seems to lie in a grcatcr coilsumption of coal at  low spceds, or wit11 
untrained stoking, than in the older tjpc. 'lliis disappears as Iiighcr 
speeds arc rcaclicd, espccially when ccononiiscrs are fittctl. 
Cot7l S/o;un~'~.-To enablc a ship to takc part in sustained opcra- 
tions at sca, cstcnding over considcrable periods, such as blockadcs or 
distant cxpcditioiis, a Iargc capacity for carrying coal is ;I matter of grcat 
iniportancc. It is true that ships will, in a11 probability, be accompanied 
by fast collicrs, and it is also truc tlint our own country is possessed of 
niorc fortilied coaling stations than any othcr ; but the less a flcct is 
dependent on these ausiliarics tlic bctter, bccausc frcqucnt coaliiigs 
dcmand much timc, and cause tlclay and interruption in tlic prosesutioii 
of the work in Iiaiid ; and evcn somctimcs wakcn  the conccntratctl 
strength of a sqiiadroii by the ncccssity of tlctacliing ships. Tlic niorc 
self-contained a ship is the Ilcttcr, for tilt Icss sIic will ~iave  to rely on 
licr base and its line of communication. 
X first-class battle-ship ought, therefore, to be dcsigiicil to carry not 
less than 2,000 tons of coal at lier fill1 buiikcr capacity, and it is higlily 
desirable that tlic bunkers should lic so arrangcd that they can bc filled, 
trimmed, and rcachcd f rox  tlic stokdiolds wi th  a minininni of labour. 
l 'hcrc arc sliips at prcsent alloat in.  which it 1)ccomcs a niattcr of tlic 
utmost dilliculty, i f  not iinpossibility, to kcep up the fucl supply at thc 
furnaces for a long spcll of fast stcnming, and whosc ~ o o d  11.1'. and spccd 
bcconic, ill coiisequcnce, to sonic csteiit wasted. At thc same timc, tliis 
is of sccoiid-ratc iniportancc to the actual ability to stow a ccrtaiii ainouiit 
somehow, for as long iis it is thcrc i n  thc  ship herself, it is only a matter 
of timc and labour to ivork it irp to thc buiikcr doors, aiitl slic rcinains 
independent of extraneous assistance. 
/. Alhdiiiin and Lkht C'uiiht Gwr Po~cL~~-.--Ol ;ill the lcssons prc- 
sciitcd i n  a c t i d  battle during tlic two recent naval \vaf", iionc h a w  been 
so instructive and iiitcrcsting as tiiosc cicrivcct . iron1 studjiiig tlrc prc- 
ciiiiiicntly rciiiarkablc rcsults of rapid medium and light calitirc slicll-fire, 
ivlieii used against unarniourcd sidcs and structures. It \\-as tlie agency 
by wliich principally, i f  not nloiic, the victorious squadrons defeated their 
ciieniics tlccisivcly at the thrco fleet actions fought ; and in tlic light of 
tlic espcrfcncc gaiiicd thcrcby it appears rcasoiiably ccrtaiii tli;it aficr 
sliips once gct within range tlic rcduction of tlicir iinariiioiircd parts LO ;L 
e. 
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ivrcck by this means will bc n niatter of minutes for one sidc o r  the otlicr, 
if not both, bringing i n  its train the attendant risks of firc and dcnioral- 
isation of their c rew.  Thc  last report of the U.S. Jlureaii of Naval 
Ordiiaiicc (diicli has already becn quoted), says that “ while heavy guns 
in turrets must be rcgnrdcd as one of the chief characteristics of niodcrn 
battleships, tlic lessons of tlic day indicate that tlic greatest csccution 
(escept agpinst the hcaviest armour) may be espcctcd froiii n numbcr of 
Q.F. guns of smaller calibre mounted scparatcly in arniouretl casements, 
or in a redoubt.” 
I3ul cvcii \vith this effected, i t  by no iiicans follows that a ~vcll- 
armoiirctl battle-ship will be niatcrially damaged in licr main figliting 
powers, arid Q.F. gitiis of 8-inch or Icss calibre can tlicrcforc only bc 
considered in the IigIit of vcry useful-arisiliarics t o  the arniament of her 
battle-ship opponcnts. They form, lio\vcver, a battlc-ship’s bcst tlefcncc 
against torpedo craft, and hcr rcadicst and quickcst 1iic;iiis of destroying 
a cruiser, as practically demons!ratcd at Santiago. 
It is here considered that, strictly speaking, no grin of more than 
G-inch approsiniatc calibre can bc rightly called a quick-fircr. ‘The real 
criterion of quick-firing ordnance lics in thc handling of ihc ammiinitioii, 
which sliould.not be too heavy to be easily and rapidly passed by ni~ziziiul 
labour cverywlicre from thc shell-room to the borc of the gun, and no 
weapon throwing a projectile of much over 100 11)s. can bc said 
to satisfy this condition. In fact, even that limit of \rcigltt somc- 
tinics proves too niuch to be manipulntcd with facility by the young 
ordinary seamen and boys of light or undeveloped physique so often 
sccn, especially in nc\vly-commissioncd ships, arid i t  ivas fourid iicccssary 
in a cruiscr in which tlic writer served to carry out morc than onc charigc 
in the quarter bill for this season. Eight-inch girris form part of tlic 
secondary armament ir; somc Amcrican ships, and h a w  donc good 
service, but thcy arc not atlvocatcd Iicrc, for tlierc is no reason to supposc 
that the snrnc numbcr of (;-inch quick-firers woultl not have done cqunlly 
ircll, if not indccd niacli better, ~rlic!i thcir grcatcr rapidity of firc is con- 
sitlcred. An &inch gun is neither oiic thing nor tlic otlicr, antl has no 
clcarly dcfincd sphere of action, for wliilc it is not poncrfril ~nougli to 
drive tlirough the thickcr plating of ;i battle-ship, on thc othcr hand it is 
far too SIOW in firc to IIC a good type of \rcal).on for tlic cspcditious 
clcstruction of licr unprotcctcd parts. Rlorcover, hoinogcncity in giins is 
every whit as desirable as homogcncity in ships, for tlic lcss variety therc 
is in calibre and dirncnsions, tlic lcss coinplication and dilliculty therc 
will bc in tlic carriagc and use of ammunition and spare parts. Thcsc 
considerations, along with others, hayc.. it!c!uced Xinerican dcsigncrs to 
abandon thcni in their rcccnt ships, although tlicrc did esist a prcjudicc 
in  thcir favour in some quarters. 
Thc  writer is of opinion that no battlc-ship should carry iiiorc 
than three sizes of guns altogcthcr, including her Iicavicst. Thc 6-inch 
and 12-poiindcr are two good standards for a secondary aniiaiiient, 
although the formcr is perhaps a shade too large for the bcst sizc in n quick- 
firer, antl, wcrc it not for ccrtain facts mcntioncd hcreaftcr, a ‘Q.F. 
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p i ,  throwing nn SO-lb. projcctilc, would be suggested for geiier;il 
service in battle-ships and cruisers of all sizes iri the British Navy. 
X wire-built SO-pounder, 40 calibres long, with a muzzle velocity of 
about 2,200 feet, could be designed to weigh not more than 4; tons, 
and should have a penetration of about 12 inches of wrought-iron. 
Considering the fact that the quick-firers of a battle-ship are, for the 
reasons already put forward, a minor part of her armament, only useful 
a,oainst cruisers or the unarmoured parts of another battle-ship, it is here 
contended that, under present conditions, the G-inch 7-ton 100-pounder 
gun is unnecessarily heavy and powerful for this object, and that :L 
battcry of twenty SO-pounders would answer the purpose better tlian one 
of twelve such. Thc  total weights ought to be approximately equal, and 
in practice the diminution in tlie size of projectile would probably 
increase thc  rapidity of sustained fire, enabling the fornicr, with its eight 
extra guns, to throw just about double the nuillbcr of shells in a given 
period than the latter could ; while nothing but tlie thickcst arniouretl 
parts of a ship could resist the attack of the lighter gun, any more than 
that of the heavier one. This is a great consideration; for, putting 
aside the fact that by doubling the number of rounds the number of 
actual hits ouglit also to be douhled-and a hit of any sort is always 
something-there can be no doubt that two SO-pounder shells would 
do more damage, as a rule, than one 100-pounder, which also might 
be over a much more ividcly diffused area. Fired at a ship with a 
casemated battery,-one of the latter could scarcely by any chance put 
more than one gun out of action, but two guns might easily bc 
disabled by two of the fornicr. Fired a t  a ship with an open battery, and 
exploding inside, either sized shell would knock over every man at the 
guns ; and when two rowids take the place of one, there is, of course, as 
previously remarked, just double the chancc of bringing this off. 
Thcrc are, however, strong arguments against sucli a change, and 
tlie G-inch gun will be adhered to, in the proposals of this essay, as the 
best for the secondary batteries of our future ships. These arguments arc 
as follons :- 
Firstly, that this gun is so widcly established and distributed through 
the Service that it must remain, and further developments in designs 
ought to proceed along the same lines, with a G-inch calibre as an 
invariable basis. 
The  introduction of a new gun would involve the far greater evil of 
adding yet another variety of ammunition to tlie present list. The other 
two arguments are based on two suppositions of a diametrically opposite 
character, which cannot both prove correct, but one of \vhich must. 
Either armour will be increased in resisting power in the future pro- 
portionately to its thickness, or it will not. If not, then the penetrating 
powers of this SO-pounder- \vould prove sulfcient for all demands likely 
to be made on them ; drrf  the adequate caseniated shelter which every 
individual gun should be affordcdsvould, by the addition of the eight cxtra 
guns necessitate an undesirable increase in the weight to be carried. 
This dilfculty might be met by either an  increase in the size of the ship, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 A
riz
on
a] 
at 
23
:38
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
3 74 G O L p  JtEI).\L I~l<rzl: BSSAC. 
a reduction iii tlic tliickuess of the ;irniour elsc\vlicrc, or ;I reduction in 
the amount. of ammunition :ind coal stowed, but all these alternatives arc 
open to objections. 
There seems no reason to be certain, however, that the resisting 
qualities of plates will not go on increasing, as improvements in tlicir 
nianufncturc are iiorkcd out or discovered, and, if so, the extra casemates 
Ixing thinner, could be carried easily enough ; but, on the other Iiantl, it 
will bocomc necessary to arm ships with more and more po\verfiil guns 
to obtain'-perforation. I t  secnis, indeed, to the writer as quite con- 
ceivable that thc thy  may not be far distant when we shall see ships 
completely encased with a shell of steel thin enough to bc carried, yet 
thick enough to be proof against anything but heavy ordnance, and tlic 
original itlea of an entirely arnioured ship, is-hich was the starting point 
forty years ago, almost returned to, t ~ i e  o n I i  (Iiaerencc being a question 
of degree. If that does come to pass, we shall have to work through tlic 
same cycle of respective advances in penetration and resistance all over 
again, but on 'a higher plane, and a gun of seven tons already in tIie 
Service will have iiiorc future value than one of four and a half, presuming 
that the designs are equally good. 
The qucstion of the pattern and size best adapted for the siiiallcst 
guns in a battle-ship is rather a diflicult one. In theory the niorc she 
can carry the better, obviously enough, and, once again, on the principle 
of homogeneity consistently extended, it would be a great thing to have 
a weapon universally suitable to a11 the units of a fleet., battle-ship, 
cruiser, and torpedo craft, if such could be devised. A disabled battlc- 
ship might in that case prove a veritable mine of n-caltli in the way of 
ammunition to a flotilla of destroyers returning with exhausted magazines 
from chasing torpedo-boats, whose services were again urgently needed, 
say at  nightfall ; which, if an esccptional, does not seem a rclmot.ely 
iniprobable contingency. The 6-pounder would ansli-cr the purpose 
w l l  enough, were i t  not for the fact face-liardcning procescss haw so 
increased the resisting power of steel, that almost any protection will foil 
the attack of such a gun now, and a heavier one is needful. 
Xoreovcr, although in thcory the extreme multiplicaticn of guns is 
sound; in practice it leads to a most undesirable complication of the 
difficulties of supplying animunitioii, and sti'pcrvising the firing. For tlicse 
reasons tlic 12-poundcr gun is taken Iicre, as approximatcly the best for 
third and last type of a battle-ship's armament. 
I t  is not proposed in this essay to advocate fighting tops, or heavy 
mists of any sort. This is perliaps a somewhat radical position to take 
lip, but it rests tlircctly as docs tjtc si;ggcstt'd thinning of water-line 
iirniour-on the overwhelming logic of practical facts cseniplified in the 
wars whose study is laid down as conditional to tlic essay. Out of a total 
of seven masts carried in Cervera's squadron, five canie down completely, 
and both the others were apparently perforated and damaged. At Yalu, 
all tlle fighting tops were disabled and Silenced on the Chinese side. In 
both engngenicnts ;tIso, tlic funnels were repeatedly struck, and it seciiis' 
cvirlciit that, 111) to a ccrtaiii point, the Ilighcr an object stands abovc tlic 
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water the inore likely this is to happen. This no  doubt is ensilyaccounted 
for, and arises mainly from errors i n  the range, which are prettF sure to 
be the commonest of a11 errors in action. A gun when orersiglited 
naturally t h r o w  over tlic object aiiiietl ;it, and, on tlic other hand, a pro- 
jectile fnlliiig short in most cases ultimately docs tlic sarne, for it nearly 
always flies high on the ricochet, as may be seen any clay at targct 
practice. 
‘Tlie net result is that a very large percentage of all the bad shots go 
over the enemy, which is almost assuredly equivalent t o  saying that this is 
the case with a large majority of the projectiles fired. I t  might, therefore, 
have been predicted with tolerable ccrtainty that high oljjects such as 
~~ ias t s ,  fiinncls, ctc., would suiicr, and cspcririicc now s1ion.s this to IN! 
the casc. ’I’hc siiiall nuinbcr of light giins carrictl i n  fighting tops forin 
an insignificant addition to the power of a battle-ship, aiitl the fall of a 
heavy steel mast, might entail very grave consequcnces, espccially if it lay 
over a barbettc. 
It is here contended, therefore, that while light masts arc quite 
necessary for signalling purposes, their uses should be restricted to that 
object. For hoisting in hcavy boats, thc French system of hinged 
“gallows ” is very well ndaptctl to a man-of-war, and either those or 
cranes such as arc carried by the “ \‘illcan” arc consitlcred preferable to 
steel masts and derricks. Both stand lowcr, and both if shot away woultl 
fall outboard, clear of the main annament, at all events. hIoreover, if tlic 
boats were left behind,-as appears likely to bc tlic casc, these could also 
be removed before sending a ship away to war. 
In the matter of machine guns, it appears probable that naval actions 
will be fought at ranges beyond the really effective use of rifle calibre or 
even rather larger weapons. At Alexandria the 1-inch Nordenfcldts did 
absolutely nothing ; but a -1-poundcr Maxim is said. to have been  
dcsigncd, and with the improved carrjing power obtained by the intro- 
duction of cordite might prove of some use if played on sighting hoods 
or aperturcs, turret ports, etc. ; or  might even very considerably affcct 
parties working on deck to clear a n y  wreckage or suppress outbreaks of 
fire. A s  a defence, moreover, against torpedo-boats or destroyers, such 
guns, in the writer’s opinion, wodd bc far supcrior to nnjthing at present 
known, and half-a-dozen or morc iiiigh~ bc mounted in every ship n it11 
great advantage, mainly with that objcct. 
The  small arms of a ship do not exactly affect licr type, but they are 
part of licr fighting equipment, and may be referred to incidentally. In 
tlic ideal battle-ship diicli  the writer is supposed to-suggest, there ~ v o d d  
be a rifle for every man, but cold stccl Iveapons \vould have no place, with 
tlie esception of the bayonets carried by these rifles. In  Egypt and the 
Soudan, the field and machine guns crews all carried rifles, and found 
inuch use for them. It is admitted that boarding pikes would have their 
uses in some directions, but in the hands of domestics and cooks it sccnis 
doubtful whether they constitute a formidable addition to the defences of 
the Empire. 
VOL. XLIV. z 
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g. ~ ~ ~ r r j ~  cmd Torpedo Pmw.-The use of the ram aiid torpedo in 
fleet actions has been somewhat discredited by the light of events in the 
t\vo recent mars ; for except in one doubtfuliy ascertained case towards the 
close of the battle of Yalu, in which it has been stated rather vaguely that 
one counteracted the other, there nas not a single occasion in which they 
were brought into use, whether this was intentional or accitlcntal. There 
seems no reason to doubt, however, that it was the former, and the reasons 
are not far to scek. 
It has been said by the advocates of these weapons, that they at  all 
evcnts modify the tactics of two fleets; that may very likcly bc so; but that 
they do not modify them to such an cstent as to materially affect the 
result, is very evident from the completc nature of the victories g5ined at  
Yalu, Manils, and Santiago itithout recourse to their use. 
I t  is also often stated that they are the weapons which should be used 
by the weaker or losing side, but that can only be effected when most 
culpable carelessness is displayed by the stronger or winning. If for 
instance, Cervera had attempted such manceuvres as a last resort, the 
American ships would merely hare required to alter course as necessary, 
and keep the Spanish tinder a raking gun fire, to settle the aff?’ I IF as 
decisively as ever ; for the latter did not possess such a superiority in speed 
as to enable them to cover the distance between the fleets in the short 
time requisite to prevent the Q.F. batteries from doing their work. 
\\‘hen used by a battle-ship, there is a similarity on general lines 
between the natures of these two weapons. Both endeavmr to act 
against the enemy through a ship’s most vulncrable parts, namely, below the 
water-line, and both in conssquence if successful must almost inevitably 
obtain results of a most decisive nature. Both also require very close 
range attack, both are entirely dependent on the handling of a ship or 
perhaps even more on pure luck, and both are at all times very uncertain 
and unreliable. Consequently both have been placed under one heading 
as requisite features in the powers of a battle-ship. Beyond this, however, 
their similarity ends ; and, as there exist points of diferencein other ways, 
they will be treated separatcly and in detail ; beginning with the torpedo, 
which, if either are resorted to, is considered ihe one most likely to be 
used. 
To begin with the placing of torpedoes, it seems quitc certain, from 
the accident to the “ Oquendo,” that all tubes should be submerged ; for 
otherti ise with torpedoes in them they are a source of imminent danger to 
the ship carrjing them. Bow tubes aboi e water are especially dangerous, 
for a ship in the “ end on ” position rcquisite for using such would have 
all her opponent’s fire concentrated on that very part. Undcr aa te r  in the 
stem, they interfere with fine entry and s p e d ,  to say nothing of a ram, 
and as torpedoes are especially unreliable in their movements ivhen fired 
ahead from a ship with way on, it is considered that in battle-ships they 
should be done away with in that position altogether. 
On the broadside hoivever they have no such drawbacks, and a pair 
of submerged tubes on each side should be carried. Placed so, they 
would be priucipally of service in deterring an enemy from ramming we11 
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a disabled ship, and in fact it has been stated;rightly or wrongly, that 
this did actrially occur in the disordered formations of the fleets at I’alu, 
when a Chinese cruiser was sunk in attempting to ram an opponent. A 
ship may be disabled in machinery and guns and still retain this power of 
defence with its great potentialities, and this alone seenis a strong argu- 
ment for the inclusion of torpedoes in the  armanicnt of a battle-ship. 
The writer holds to the opinion hoIvever, that perhaps a still better 
position for a submerged tube is astern ; because the knon.ledge that an 
adversary carried this stipg in her tail would. have the rnost pronounced 
influence of a1l.h preventing attemps to ram ; for if  the ramming sliip 
missed her stroke, she ought to be  herself inevitably sunk. Torpedoes 
run somewhat erratically froin stern tubes, but not to such an extent that 
they could very well help hitting the  target presented by the whole length 
of a ship only a few yards off. She might of course try the effects of a 
shot from one of her own broadside tubes in return, but her chances of 
success would be very poor, as the target Gould be snial), and the torpedo 
almost certainly deflected by the back-wash off her opponent’s propellers. 
T h e  ram as a ii-ezpon has of late years been in very great f x o u r  in 
theory, but practically it hris only achieved one prominent success in battle, 
and that ii-as at Lissa, which took place before the era of M’hitehead tor- 
pedoes. The  fearful results hoivever, arising from its accidcntal use led 
a strong section of popular and professional opinion to jump to con- 
clusions as to its value, nithout considering the antecedent conditions 
of the cases. Neither the “Vanguard,” “ Grosser Kurfiirst,” nor 
“ Victoria” were making any attempts to evade it, until the last few 
moments ; and it seems safe to assert that none of them would evcr have 
alloaed the ships by which they were sunk to approach so very closely 
had they been enemies in action, or, if they had, would have first inflicted 
decisive injury with their own armaments. 
Ramming is at best beset with difficulties: a desperate business, 
which should only be resorted to when all else has failed, and desperate 
measures are necessary ; and even then it can seldom be anything but a 
matter of luck. To begin with, a ship must first possess superiority in 
speed, or  turning power, or both. She must next force her \vay through 
the whole zone of her enemy’s fire, in which, if the enemy is handled 
with any judgment, she will, as a rule, be kept for a sufficiently long 
period to decide events by the guns one way or the other. If not, lion- 
ever, she nest comes within range of his torpedoes, and in nine cases out 
of ten within their bcaring. Supposing, again, these miss, and she still 
survives so far, then the greatest of her difficulties, and the greatest of 
hcr dangers, appear at  the end ; the first of these lying in her final move- 
ments immediately preceding actual contact, and the &second in her 
position should the attempt fail. I t  is often said that there is only half a 
ship’s length between rammink and being rammed, and when two ships 
are moving at fast, but probably at more or less uncqual, speeds, and on 
constantly varying courses, the accuracy of judgment and eye necessary 
to make contact at  the right moment and place a matter of cerfaiizfy is 
scarely possessed by any human being. But failure to ram ought almost 
2 2  
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always to bring fatal consequences in its train to tlie ship attempting it if 
the  enemy herself. has a ram forward, and a submerged torpedo-tube 
ready for action aft ; for if the effort is really a determined one, it will be 
too late to sheer up on the encjny’s beam h m  it is seen the stroke is 
going to fail, and the ship must consequently pass on cither across the 
former’s b o w  or under her stern. In  tlic first case, she would herself 
suffer the fate that she proposed inflicting, and. in the second, she would 
be blown up. Finally, escaping all these dangers, supposing she actually 
succeeds in getting the blo\< home, she will then probably find herself in 
a disabled or even sinking condition, if we can judge by the experiences 
of the “ K o i i i i  Wiltiel~ii ” or “ Cainpcrdo\vn.” This is justifiable only 
when her loss or disablement was already a foregone conclusion, as in  
the  predicament of a small ship unable to escape from a larger, or one 
badly beaten in gunnery from licr victorious opponent ; and i n  these 
special cases the opportunity ought never to arise, as previously stated, i f  
the winning ship is ordinarily careful. 
As a .rani, ho\vever, is not in itself detrimental to ship’s speed or 
general eflicicncy, tlie difliculties and dangers attendant on its use need 
not by any means altogetlier prohibit its inclusion in  the construction-of 
a battle-ship ; and therc exists besides tlie argunient in its favour arising 
from tlie hypothetical case just quoted, o r  of an enemy inisjudging her 
movements at the critical moment, and getting remmcd liersclf. This 
presents it i n  tlie light of a useful weapon of defence, and one that is at 
any rate likely to influence tlie enemy’s tactics. I t  is considered here, in 
consequence, that it should always form a feature in a battle-ship, although 
as the least important of her fighting essentials. 
Intimately connected with the use of rani and torpedo is the question 
of a ship’s turning and manccuvring power, for it is by the movements of 
a ship alone that they are brought to bear, and not, as in the case of 
guns, partly by the independent training of the weapcns themselves. 
A ship’s turning capabilities’arc dependent on her nnder-water lines 
2r.d tlie area and position of her rudder, a_ssisted occasionally by the use 
of twin screm. As a rule, the best shapes for manceuvring are not con- 
ducive to speed, and, in tlic eKoorts to obtain the latter therc lias been to 
some estent an unavoidable retrogression in the former from the types of 
tncnty years ago. At that time the ram held a very prominent place in 
the general cstimation, and as the short full shapes which are best adapted 
to  its use also possess good buoyancy, many ships were designed and built 
on these lines which nould be considered very deficient in speed by the 
standards now accepted. As the great value of speed came to be recognised, 
these designs gradually gave way to the longer,and finer ones of the present 
day, which, although entailing, as before stated, partial forfeiture of 
tnanccuvring power, must, on the whole, be considrred a distinct advance 
when the relativc importance of the two is in question. 
Having got the speed, however, it is, of course, advisable to get the 
best turning powers that will go Jvith it .  The removal of the “ tlead- 
wood,” as in some late designs, oiiglit to lielp ton.ards this. The  drawback 
to it is, that it seems to throw constructional difficulties in the way of 
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fitting balanced ruddcrs in large ships, froni the conscquent want of a 
]on.cr support, although this is not the casc with small ones. If, however, 
this could be overcomc, it ~vould be very dcsirablc, for the advantages of 
a balanced, or partially-balanced rudder, especially in case of manipula- 
tion, are incontestable. 
To summarise the itleas, then, of this essay, as to the points which, 
d i c n  conibincd in the whole; \vould produce tlic bcst typc of battle-ship 
for tlic British Service, she should first posscss sca-going qtialitics of tlic 
highest order. Her nrinament should comprise four 15-inch. wire guns 
of the latest mark, disposed in pairs en  6,zrleffe, either oil the mountings and 
mcchanisin which obtain in our latest ships, or clectricallp controlled ; at 
least fourteen G-inch quick-firers ; t\vcnty 19-pounder ,quick-firers ; and 
sis or eight 1-pounder Xisinis. Thc protection ~rould consist of 15-inch 
plating for tlic barbcttes, &inch on thc sidcs of thc citadcl and front 
part of the cascniatcs of all the 6-inch guns, 4 or 5 inches right 
round the water-line, thickcncd to 10 just abrcast the cngincs, and 10-inch 
on the conning toircr;, with 10-iiich hoods for the barbctte guns. Slic 
\vould also carry R 2- or  3-inch stccl deck fore and aft, thickened to 
4 or 6 inches bclow thc slopc of the turtle-back, and a 1-inch stccl deck 
over the ccntral spacc be twen thc barbettes. Her  speed would bc 
cightecn knots, and she ~rould be propelled by twin scrcws, tlLc stcani 
bcing gencratcd in water-tube boilcrs. I-Icr total coal stonagc would 
aniount to tn’o thousand tons. She would carry five submerged tukes- 
two on each brondsidc, one aft-and a rani. Shc irould have no heavy 
nia5ts or fighting tops, and all fittings of cvery description noi absolutely 
rcquired, and likely to incrcnsc tlic cffcct of an cncmy’s shell fire, nonltl 
be rcducctl to a minimum, and niadc easily rcrnovablc at short noticc if 
neccssary, the  boat-hoisting arrangcnicnts provitlod bcing either cranes 
or “  gallon.^." The ship herself ~voul t l  require to bc large cnough to carry 
her weights on a total displacement of about fiftccn thousand tons, and 
would in general structural design rescniblc H.3I.S. ‘ I ,  Formidable.” As 
niattcrs of miscellaneous dctail, she would liavc a balanccd rudder, if 
possiblc, and no “ dcad\rood” ; her firc-cstinguishing arrangcrncnts would 
lie cntircly below the steel protective deck, with the exception of thc 
uptakes and dclivcries ; and no permancnt woodwork of any sort, whether 
on decks or else\vhcrc, would be worked into her. Such a ship, ivell 
olliccrcd and manncd-on ~vliich point we can lcavc our minds at rcst- 
rvould, in  tlic writer’s opiriion, prow pcrfcctly adcquntc in all nays for 
the acconiplishincnt of any task \vhich fell to her lot, if called upon to takc 
lier place in a 13ritish fleet cngagcd on activc service against any possiblc 
opponcnts. 
PART I I .-FI RST- CLASS C RU I SE ICS. 
“ I n  the designing of a cruiser, as of any class of war-ship, 
the first stcp, bcforc which none should bc. takcn, is to decide 
the primary object to bc rcalised-what is this ship meant to do ? To 
this primary requiremcnt every othcr feature should be subordinated.” 
So nritcs Captain Nahan i n  thc article in the Times, which has alrcadp 
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been quoted more than pnce, and although some of his contentions in 
other articles of this series have been much disputed, it seems scarcely 
likely that this one ivill fail t o  find a universal acceptance. 
It is, therefore, a much more difficult and conlples affair to form 
definite or  pronounced opinions a s  to the best type of cruiser than to 
decide as to the best type of battle-ship, as the duties of the former are 
much the more varied of thc two. A battle-ship proper is built with a 
single purpoie in view, that is to say, the construction of a vessel n-hose 
whole business is to fight for the command of the sea against all conlers, 
no  matter how poiwxful, and the purely superlative in fighting qualities 
should therefore be aimed at throughout. h cruiser, however, is 
primarily a scout, or, a t  any rate, that is the view the writer takes ; and, 
kcondly, a guardian of commerce and lines of communication. Her  
first distinctive characteristic must consequently, in any case, be the 
possessionLof high speed, and a cruiser without speed is about useful 
as a cart without \vlieels. 13ut for the effective performance of the latter 
of her duties at least, she mis t  also possess morc or less fighting strength, 
for the mere definition of a “guardian ” iniplies the attribute of power in 
some sort of degree. 
I t  is maiply on this point that any decision as to the best type of 
cruiser is so open to controversy. A battle-ship cannot be too strong ; 
a cruiser can, if it should be  proved that, her strength is detrimental to 
her speed, or an  amount of money has been espended on obtaining that 
strength which could have been laid out better in building instead two or 
more ships with less fighting power, but better adaptations as cruisers 
otherwise. Writing of cruisers in the article quoted above, Captain 3Iahan 
remarks that “rapidity of action is ‘their primary .object. Defensive 
strength . . . does not conduce to rapidity of movement, nor does offensive 
power ; they must thyrefore be very strictly subordinated. They must not 
detract from speed ; yet so far,as they do  not injure that, they should be 
developed, for by the power to repel an enemy-to avert detention-they 
minister to rapidity.” 
If then a cruiser ought not to be unnecessarily ponerful, the question 
is, how much strength does she really require? and as a result of the great 
divergence of opinion on this point, modern cruisers range in dimensions 
from 2,000 to 14,000 tons, with every intermediate size possible ; and are 
armed with a heterogeneous assortment of weapons varying in weight 
from one to thirty odd tons, and in numbers to almost the same extent 
in different indii idual ships. Sonic cruisers arc, indeed, almost battle- 
ships ; others not much more than large- torpedo-boats, or lightly ;it med 
merchant-steamers. 
With such 3 variety as this, dificulties arise in selecting any particular 
existing type AS an ideal, and it is therefore proposed instead to examine 
the sphere of action in ivhich our cruisers may be espected to find their 
proper place, and endeavour to work with that starting point alone, 
assisted by the espericncc of the recent wars ; which, as regards cruisers, 
exhibit some valuable lessons. 
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TO qualify for t~icir first linc of duty, then, as scouts for a fleet, i t  
seecls reasonable to assuinc that they do not require to possess much 
except high and easily sustained speed, with at  least fair coal stowage ; 
and even small or lightly armed shipj will answer the purpose very wcll if 
they have these. Torpedo-gunboats have frcqiiently, during manceuvres, 
been allotted to the same duties as first-class cruisers, and have somc- 
times performed tliem even better by reason of their very smallness, which 
to some estcnt cnabled them to escape the enemy’s notice. In  18% a 
detached scouting squadron of two cruisers antl two gun-boats belonging 
to C fleet, wcrc surprised off 1,and’s End by the ‘‘ enemy” in force, and 
obliged to run. One of the gun-hoat5 by hugging the shore under tlie 
cliffs and covering her funncls and white paintwork kith iwt canvas, 
eluded observation altogether ; awl by doubling lxick managed to join 
her own main fleet before daylight, long before either of the two cruisers, 
on xhom tlie enemy’s attention and chase had been concctitmted from 
their very size. As it Iiappencd, the adiniral bad already received news 
of the encniy’s movements from the coastguard ; but it might very well 
have bccn otherwise, in Ivhich CRSC this small craft would have bcen thc 
first to bring it  by many honrs; and this particular instance is by no 
inearis a singular one of that sort of thing. 
The chief dralvback to a small ship in such work lies ill the clifiiculty 
of transmitting distant signals, and, even more, of receiving thcm, for in 
a seaxay their movements are so lively that it is quite impossible to keep 
a glass fixed on any object, altliough tile introtluction of truck sciiiaplirtres 
h_as considerably obviated this defect, I n  larger ships it disappears 
altogether, and there can apparently be 110 question that big ocean-going 
lincrs, of comii~anrling speed, may prove extremely useful as-scouts. 
This point was strongly remarked by the late Admir;il yoinby \\.hen 
referring to the pcrforniances of the “Oregon” in his report on the 
lSS5 manoeuvres, antl we have thc instance of the use of vessels of this 
class by the Americans, in their recent war. I t  is true that Cervera 
evaded their search, but that was in no way due to the ships themselves, 
and would have occurred none the less had they been powerful first-class 
cruisers instead of lightly armed mail-boats. 
\Ire are sometimes told that a scouting. ship sliould be capable not 
only of getting information herself, but of preventing the’enemy’s scouts 
froin getting it, and ought therefore aln-ays to possess at  least fair 
fighting power. There ilia). be something in this, but not, in the writer’s 
opinion, enough to ivarrant the outlay of heavy sums in building powerful 
cruisers, had they not other duties to’perforni. In  the first place, if we 
adhere to our true policy of taking the offensive, it will rest with our  fleet 
to find the enemy at all. times, and, if the enemyare equally anxious to 
engage, neither side will have any object iri eluding observation. If; 
however, they are desirous of ayoidiiig fleet action, it wiil be they who 
wish to prevent the acquisition of intelligence as to their movements, not 
we. Secondly. the fact should be borne in mind that for the total cost of 
one first-class cruiser, ten good torpedo-gunboats, or five good third- 
ciass cruisers, can be turned out, all of equally high speod ; atid if the tcri 
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gun-boats, or evcii the five smaller cruiwrs w r c  to Set to work to find 
out what was going on, the single big ship could ccrtai!iIy not prevcnt'it. 
She ]night chase or drive off one or two, but irhile her attention 1va5 SO 
fixed, tllc rest, provided they liiid sea room, ~vould only Iiave to disperse, 
LO slip past her out of range in any direction they plcisctl. 
If,  therefore, cruisers only existed to provide eyes and cars to the 
battle-ship squadrons, the  types suggested in this essay as being in the 
main the best adapted for the purpose would be' small ones, though with 
a proportion of large but lightly armed craft in addition. As previously 
remarked, ho\vcver, cruisers. have other duties besides this ; for on them 
must chiefly fall the task of protecting commerce in general, and the lines 
of communication over which the supplies for the fleets travel during war. 
For this branch of their work, the three principal necessities of a 
scout-that is to say, perfect seaworthiness, high speed, and large coal 
stowage-are also necessary, forming a good foundation on which to 
make a start, but not in themselves suficicnt. To protect the conimcrce 
entrusted to their care they must be ablc to nicct on at lcast equal terms 
the opponents endcavoaring to destroy it. Here, then, we liavc sonie- 
thing more or less definite to go upon, and the distinguishing features of 
foreign cruisers should directly influence and control the types I Y ~  build 
ourselves, for the iiiere existence of thcsc possiblc cneniics imposes upon 
us the necessity of producing sliips to match them. 
liecping this always in mind, therefore, the writer proposes now to 
consider the characteristics \vliich should predominate in the vcsscls 
designed to serve as lhitisli cruisers of all classes. 
A first-class cruiser i n  the British Xavy ought to be a match for 
auy first-class cruiser in the world, for it may fall to her  lot to be sent in 
chase of such a ship, should the latter bc ?espatched on a coninicrcc- 
destroying expedition. To attain this ideal; the writer lioltis to the 
opinion that her requisites stand in the following order :- 
a. Seaworthiness. 
6. Speed. 
c. Coal stowage. 
d. AIediuni calibre gun power. 
e. Protection. 
f .  Rain and torpedo powr .  
(1. Srozi.or/hitzrss.-It might almost be said that se:gvorthiness is of 
grcatcr iiiiportiiiice to a Uritisli cruiser t l i i i i i  to ;I Liritisli battle-ship w r c :  
it riot the most iiiiportant necessity iri  both, for although either must be 
prepared to keep the sea in all weathers, the latter is less likely to find 
herself conipellcd to figlit in a g d e  thaii the former. Foreign battlc-ships 
are rarely such good sca boats as c u r  oivn,-wrne of them-such as the 
American " Indiana "-betng unable ewii to work their giins if it is 
blowing really hard, and it would consequently be a most:improbable 
circumstance to find them at sea at all nnder these conditions if they 
could possibly help it. Foreign cruisers, on the contrary, are often reniark- 
ably fine sea boats, and. as very stormy weather will always drive blockading 
torpedo-boats atid torpedo-boat destroyers t o  slicltcr, it is just at  these 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 A
riz
on
a] 
at 
23
:38
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
GOLV 3IEDhL PRIZE ESSAY. 383 
periods that we may expect to find commerce-destroyers endeavouring 
to slip out of blockaded ports. The  seaworthiness of our own cruisers 
ought, tliereforc, to be of such a nature that they can not only remain 
at sea, but fight at sea at all times, carrying their battery, or part of it 
at any rate, high above the water, and possessing sufficient freeboar! 
forwrd to stand driving against a sea without losing too much speed, 
or preventing the use of their forecastle guns while in chase. 
A ship of this sort might even make things wry awkward for a low 
freeboard or coast-defence battle-ship, if  she happened to catch her out- 
side, in a heavy gale. Fortunately most of our cruisers arc uncommonly 
fine sea boats, and the high forecastle universally adopted in the later 
types gives them excellent chasing qualities. 
TO get really formidable offensive powers, however, xith fair pro- 
tection and high speed under such conditions, it is necessary to build at 
least a 13,030-ton ship. 
S’‘eed.-Captain Malian, in his article already twice quoted, says 
that “rapidity of action is a cruiser’s primary object,’! and if great sea- 
worthiness lias been placed before high speed liere, it  is only because the 
latter cannot be attained in sea-going ships until the former has been first 
secured. 
High speed is obviously a matter of vital importance to a cruiser in 
\vliatever branch of her work she may be employed. If scouting she 
must be fast cnougli to escape capture by tlie enemy, while at the same 
time, to be of any use, keeping closely in touch with him ; and must, 
tlicrewith, be capable of carrying important intelligence with a minimum 
of dciay. If, on the other Iinnd, she is employed in the defence of com- 
merce, she can only hope to fulfil her task by having the p o w r  of catching 
up tlie enemy’s speediest ships that are attaclii1ig it, and bringing them to 
action. 
12earing this in mind, then, it is here maintained that as several 
foreign cruisers are now afloat which can travel at twenty-three knots, or 
eren slightly morc under favourable conditions, a first-class cruiser to 
attain to tlie standard required of her in our Navy should be able to steam 
at a reliable tiventy-four. To get this commanding speed a vcssel must 
.be built on fine lines ; and it is chiefly because fine lines cannot be con- 
bined with great buoyancy or carrying power, as previously remarked, 
that cruisers are unable t- carry the great weights necessary for a bat?le- 
ship, even ~ v h e n  of a size ihich is approximately the same. 
As regards the propelling agency when such speeds are aimed at, 
it is the writer’s belief that triple screws may after all prove an advantage, 
although admitting there cannot be said to exist as yet sufficient esperience 
to warrant a pronounced opinion to that effect. T h e  ;re at present in 
what may be considered an experimental stage in some foreign Kavies ; 
and, although they present objectionable characteristics in a multiplication 
of the machinery, and a complication of structural features in the hull, 
there is this much to be said in” their favour, that they must reduce the 
chances of total or pattial disablement or loss of speed, and also greatly 
facilitatc a sudden iiicrcase of speed if a ship is called upon to make it. A 
6. 
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ship moving at  a leisurely rate, using the central propeller, arid keeping a 
reserve of steam for tlie others, would probably cruise more economically 
than a twin-screw ship, and have the poker to put on. a spurt at almost a 
moment’s notice. Some cruisers are fitted with two sets of engines to 
each shaft, one set being capable of disconnection with these objects in 
view ; but this plan can hardly be pronounced as a success. A noticeable 
example of one of ’ i t s  drawbacks is afforded by the case of the U.S. 
steam-ship ‘ I  Brooklyn ” : \\.hen Cerverx’s squadron suddenly appeared 
coming oufbf Santiago Ikiy at top speed, the Ihooklyii ” was cruising 
wi th  her lorn-art1 engines uiicoupled. There was no time then, however, 
to spare for connecting up, .and she was forced to do thc best she could 
without. As it proved, the Spaniards were unable to get more than 
fourteen knots out of any o f  their ships, and the ‘. Brooklyn ” was not 
therefore out of the chase after all ; but if her enemies had been able to 
work up to their “ paper ” speeds, she inost uridoubtedly would have been 
w i t h  lialf her iiiotive power lying idle all the tin. 
Thc points in favour of wtcr-tube boilers Invc alrcady been 
rciiiarkctl i i i  ;L previous section of tliis essay, and necd not be repented. 
In the views of the witer they arc just as suitablc to a cruiser as a 
battle-ship. 
I here is one more matter of &tail directly affecting the question of 
speed, especially in ships with fine lines. and that is, the desirability or 
otherivise of sheathing and coppcring. A sheathed ship is very slightly 
heavier and coarser in her lines than an unsheathed one, and consequently, 
when both arc clean, very slightly slower. After a brief spell out of dock 
this inferiority usmlly disappears, and in the process of time as the 
unsheathed ship begins to foul, the relative superiority beconies inverted 
in favour of the shcathed. A s  the work required of our big cruisers may, 
and indeed oftcn does, take them on long trips, without opportunitics for 
docking, tlic sheathing must on the whole therefore be taken as an 
advantage, and is consitlered liere as tlcsirnblc in such vessels. 
Cod Sfoa+ip.--For a cruiser the question of coal stowage is even 
inore important than for i~kxittle-ship. ’ A small capacity would detract 
most seriously from her efficiency as a guardian of commerce by prevent-. 
ing her from being able to cover at good speeds the l,ong distances she 
may be requi: d to make between ports in chase of hostile ships. 
Frequent coalil;c;.s mean frequent delays, and militate against the rapidity 
of action, which is a cruiser’s essential property. Nost of the large 
vesscls of this class. nliich have been built abroad for tlie special purpose 
of attacking conimerce, carry. enough c o d  to steam a distance of ten to 
twelve thousand miles at tlieir cconomic‘al speeds, some even rather 
further. A Ilritish cruiser in chase would in general work with the 
advantage of a much larger choice of coaling bases, of course, as we 
possess them in or near all the more important lines of traftic, and foreign 
countries d;‘ not ; but frequent stoppages might be fatal to successful 
pursuit. I f  foreign cruisers can steam for twelve thousand miles, then 
our oivn cruisers should be able to do tlic same, and a tliirtceii-tliousaii[~- 
r ,  
c. 
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ton ship would require for the purpose a bunker capacity of not less than 
two thousand five hundred '.ens, probably more. 
I t  has been remarlied by Captain Jiahan, in the article already SO 
repeatedly quoted, that a minute sub-division of a cruiser’s bunkers, with 
the idea of reducing her chances of being sunk in action, is, after all, 
most undesirable ; and he instances the “ Jiinneapolis ” as an example. 
The time lost in coaling and trimming coal in that vessel proved a serious 
drawback to her efficiency in doing her proper cruiser work. As lie 
points out, this is a case in which a cruiser has been given excessive 
defensive p o w r ,  which detracts from her rapidity of action. It is held in 
this article thcrefore, that our cruiser’s bunkers should be placed and 
designed as simply as possible to avoid this serious defect. . 
11h(liii111 Calibre GUII %zuer.-A cruiser cannot carry the heavy 
armament of a battle-ship, and in consequence ought never to attempt to 
engage one i f  she can avoid it. She must, however, have suficient powers 
of offence to be a match for ships of her own class, so long as these 
powers do not act detriiiientally to her good. The question arises therc- 
fore as to what is the best kind of armament for the purpose, and the 
aiiswer seems fairly plain. H e r  enemy is, even i f  to some extent 
annoured, usually a weak target which can bc destroied by light gun-fire. 
Sis-inch guns are quite large enough for the purpose,’and as a matter of 
course, the more that can be brought to bear upon her the sooner will 
the object be accomplished. Heavier weapons, such as 8- or %inch guns 
are unnecessarily powerful, but a t  the same time not powerful enough to 
enable her ever to face a battle-ship, and they are much slower in their 
action than lighter ones, which is a serious drawback. Remembering this, 
therefore, and also the fact that two 6-inch guns can be carried for one 
S-inch, or three for one 9*2-inch, the writer contends in favour of thc lighter 
weapons throughout, supplemented by 12-pounders; and advocatesa battery 
of eighteen or more 6-inch, and at least a dozen l!?-pounders, as the best 
for a first-class cruiser. Of the G-inch, two would be carried in small 
turrets high on the forecastle, at least thirty feet above the water ; for a 
cruiser should possess good chasing qualities in all weathers. TWO more 
would be on the quarter-deck, also in‘ turrets ; and the remainder on the 
broadside, as high and me11 separated as possible, the upper tier at least 
twenty-five feet above water. T h e  12-pounders would be carried, if 
possible, immediately above the casemates of the lower deck 6-inch, SO 
as to get the  benefit of the casemating as a protection for their ammuni- 
tion supply, and a 12-pounder gun might, with advantage, be placed 011 
top of cad i  of the small 6-inch gun turrets on the forecastle and 
quarterdeck. 
Nore or heavier guns than this could no doubt be carried, but it is as 
great amistake to over-arm a cruiser as a battle-ship. The  “Reina Regenle” 
was lost to Spain some years before the war, apparently for no other 
reason than that she was so much overyighted in this way that she could 
not weather an ordinary gale. The  excessiqe and mixed armaments put 
on board many cruisers, built by private firms in our country for foreign 
Savics, are to be deprecated on this account, and also because it is at least 
d. 
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doubtful as to whether the scantlings of the ships are really stout eIlotlgi. 
for them. They may come successfully out of such things as contractors 
trials, etc, but whether they will be equal to the milch more severe and 
prolonged trials of war is quite another matter. Both the American vessels 
“ Iowa” and I ‘  Texas ” nere considered successes after they were built, 
but we find in the appendix to the official report of the U.S. Bureau of 
Navigation on th’c war remarks such as these:-“The ‘1o:va’s’ 12-inch guns 
both forward and aft injured the structure of the vessel, and her deck beams 
were deflected to such an extent that the trolleys which supported the 
lower torpedo-tubes became useless,” and again in the“?.exas” the rivets of 
the steel deck were sheared, allowing the deck itself to be separated from 
the supporting beams, the blast of the Ill-inch guns was responsible for 
the damage, and the chief executive ofiicer reports that the “ Tesas ” \vas 
framed too slightly ‘ I  to permit the further firing of the 12-inch guns over 
the decks without serious injury.” I t  is true that these arc both battle- 
ships and not cruisers, but their case is quoted ,merely to emphasise the 
point that vessels may be accepted as perfect in all respects from the 
builders’ hands and yet fail under stress of actual war. 
h-ohxhh.-The right amount of protection to supply to a cruiser 
is a very open question. Captain ;\[ahan’s axiom that defensive powers 
must be subordinated to s p e d  is not always followed in foreign countries ; 
and that being the case, we have no option but to handicap the speed of 
some of our ships also, by making them carry armour in order tliat they 
may have the power to meet possible enemies on equal terms. 
As against a battle-ship, a cruiser’s speed must be her principal, 
if not almost her only, safety. She ought, however, to be strong enough 
to stand her chance with any vessel of her own class, and, in fact, she 
must be so if she is to be of any use in stopping depredations on commerce. 
T h e  question of the best disposition of the light plating she must to 
some extent carry becomes then a matter of great importance, in order 
that she may not be hampered with any valueless weight ; and the theory 
already advanced in this essay, that, in the present era of quick-firers 
and high explosives, it has become a more urgent matter to protect 
guns and men than water-lines, applies equally to cruisers, if it  applies at 
all. I t  is by the esample of cruisers that the Icsson is presented, and 
although Cervera’s squadron did actually surrender to battle-ships, this 
mas riot due to the battle-ships’ heavy weapons-their distinctive feature 
as battle-ships-but to their light, or, in other words, to the samc agency 
which would be used by another cpiiser. I t  was aImost entirely by the 
fire of 6-inch or smaller guns-with the exception of sonic 8-inch 
hits-that the Spanish ships were so badly smashed up and their c r c w  
so utterly demoralised, that they were very soon run ashore hopelessly 
defeated, although with n-ater-lines and machinery practically intact, 
save for a few G-pounder scratches here and there. 
In  the type of ship we a v  now discussing, consequently, the whole 
of the G-inch armament shoyld be carried in separate casemates, with 
front plating of not less than 6-inch Harveyized or other hardened steel, 
and side and rear plating of about four. Every caseinate would have 
e. 
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a 5-inch ammunition supply trunk, carried right below tlie water-line. 
The forecastle and quarter-deck guns would each be covered coniplctely 
by a small turret or circular shield, worked by liand, with similar 
thicknesses of armour in front and rear. I t  is very noticeable from 
the reports on tlie conditions of the Spanish cruisers, that the rear, as 
w l l  as the front, of a gun should be to some estent shcltered, for 
shclk often esplodc ivcll inside ;I ship. I t  is also worthy of remark 
that an-insuniciently thick shield is worsc than none at all, as it may 
cause the explosion of-a shell that \vould otherwise Iiarc passed clear 
altogether, while .being incapable of affording adequate protection from 
its effects. This k a s  proved in both wars, and attention was specially 
tlrairn to it in the American ofticial report by referring to an occurrence 
of this nature on board the “ Oqiicndo.” 
The  same report remarks that the protective tlccks did their work 
~rcll in all the lost ships. This is for us one of the most satisfactory 
comments on the whole war, as these decks originated with Ecglisli 
designers, and are an almost universal feature in our cruisers ; and with 
the definite knowledge that is thus acquired as to their great eficacy, it 
apparently becomes a question- nhether a belt is really of any use to a 
cruiser at all. A protective deck performs double functions, for it not 
only shelters the vitals of tlic ship froin the direct horizontal impact of an 
entering projectile, but also from the incessant explosions of shells which 
a€e taking place above them during an engagement, and t h e  latter form 
almost certainly the greater danger of the two. ti belt, on the other 
Iiand, only provides against the first, and, as frequently remarked already, 
tlic risk of serious damage by this nicans appears to be  decidedly remote. 
A few very lig’lt shells, however, did strike Ccrvera’s ships in the 
region of the ,\rater-line, although nothing that a 4-inch plate would 
not have resisted; and, as admitted in dealing with the protective 
features of battle-ships, these might cause trouble, if not danger, should 
they succeed in entering. A 4-inch belt, therefore, would be supplied 
to the cruiser suggested by this essay, reduced gradually to 2 at the 
estrcmities of the ship ; and this, in conjuction with a complete “ turtle 
back” protective deck,’ varying from 2 to 4 inches in thickness with 
the aiiglc of its slopes, ~rould complete her protective arrangenicnts. with 
the exception of her conning tower an? a 3-inch shell proof trunk 
round the ’tween-deck funnel casings, ‘The combined weight of case- 
niatcs, trunks, turrets, and belt would, when the reductJon in the thickness 
of the belt is considered, be less than the \reight already carried by many 
cruiscrs provided with heavy belts. 
I n  a cruiser the removal before action of all fitti,ngs likely to increase 
tlie destructive effects of slicll fire is, in the writer’s opinion, an even 
niore important step than in a battle-ship, becau‘se the  crew are, on the 
\vI~olo, less protected. All the argi!ments advanced in support of this 
when dealing with tlie subject in connection with battle-sliips hold 
equally, therefore, if not more, in the case of cruisers ; and tliere is one 
more to be added, if the cruiser is built. after the pariicular t jpe  here 
suggested. Thc removal of armour from tlic water-line to the gun 
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positions means the heightening of a certain amount of the weight 
carried, and it consequently has the one dralvback of reducing the 
stability of a ship to some extent. It may be doubted if the reduction 
would be sufficient to endanger her, but in any case a ship can scarcely 
have too much stability, and the absence of all unnecessary top hamper, 
of course, greatly helps to obtain it. , For those various reasons, then, it 
seems probable that a great mistake would be committed by encumber- 
ing  such a ship with heavy steel m p s ,  derricks, fighting tops, and 
an  elaborate profusion of upper-deck superstructures. 
Rnm arid Torpdo Pmu.-The subjects of a cruiser’s manccuvring, 
ramming, and torpedoing powers have been here included, in the same 
way as a battle-ship’s under one heading, because the two latter are mainly 
dependent on the former. 
The  writer is unable to add much to what has already been said on 
this topic, when it came under treatment in connection with battle-ships ; 
but a cruiser may perhaps have somewhat greater needs for the power 
conferred by the possession of these weapons, in order that she may be 
able to resort to them as a last appeal, in the c x e  of finding escape from 
a battle-ship impossible by any other means. Even then her c h a n e s  arc 
poor, for the length of a thirteen-thousand-ton cruiser of twenty-four 
knots must entail a large turning circle, and therefore detract very con- 
siderably from her manceuvring capabilities. There is, no doubt, a bare 
chance, that by a pronounced superiority of speed, she might force herself 
close enough to a battle-ship to use a broadside tube ; or in theory to ram 
her by sheer persistency in folloxing in her wake and running her down. 
But to render either o f  these cases possible, the gunnery of the battle- 
ship would have to be of the faultiest description ; and if a cruiser had 
such a very commanding advantage in speed, it is tlificult .to conceive 
how she mould find herself within range of the battle-ship guns at all ; 
unless in a fatuous endeavour to force her way out of a narrow blockaded 
harbour in broad daylight, as Cervera did. 
Cervera, however, did not have a superiority in speed, as it proved, 
an’tl, moreover, played exactly into his enemy’s hands, by concentrating 
his squadron, instead of dispersing it. His  fate, therefore, does not prove 
that it mould be impossible for a very fast cruiser to escape in even that 
case, by trusting to her heels entirely, if the blockaders were fat enough 
off at the start, or lost time in getting after her, and she would probably 
be  better advised in following this line of action than in making attempts 
to ram them, if they had even pasgably good “ men bzhind the guns,” and 
were properly handled. Supposing, as a case, she was faster than they 
were by as much as ten knots, and a battle-ship was two miles distant to 
begin with. To coiver this distance and rant, the cruiser would require 
about twelve minutes, if the battleship steamed off at once, and com- 
menced what might be called “ an offensive retreat,” paradoxical though 
it may sound. An ‘ I  end-on” pursuing vessel, however, is the easiest of 
all things to hit, and in tivelve minutes, at short and easily ascertained 
ranges, she would almost certainly have had enough. This is, besides, an 
estreme case, as few battle-ships now are so decidedly inferior to cruisers 
f. 
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in speed as all that, and, moreover, n ith the least advantage in turning 
poiver on their side, could prolong the  twelve minutes indefinitely if -it 
proved necessary. Nevertheless, as a ram and submerged tubes do not 
detract from a cruiser's speed, and as the chances of using them seem, 
even if remote, at  least always a possibility, it  is considered here that a 
cruiser should be provided with them on the same plans as a battle-ship. 
It is true that the French have discarded rams altogether in some of their 
new cruisers, but that is probably more for the sate of disgr&c than any- 
thing else, for the purpose in view in buildiiig these ships is transparently 
obvious. This, therefore, in the writer's opinion, does not constitute an 
argument against them. 
A type of vessel, then, which would embody the writer's views as one 
well suited to perform the duties of a first-class cruiser in our Service, 
would be a large, highly seaworthy ship with a speed of twenty-three or 
twenty-four knots ; an armament of eighteen G-inch quick-firers, supple- 
mented by 12-pounder quick-firers and 1-pounder Maxims ; a coal 
stowage enabling her to cover twelve thousand miles ; armouretl casemates 
for her G-inch guns, 6 inches thick in front and 4 in rear; a complete 
protective deck; a v;ater-line belt of not niorz than 4 inches thickness 
at its niasimum ; shell-proof trunks to her funnel casings ; three submerged 
torpedo-tubes, and a ram. A vessel of thirteen thousand tons total dis- 
placement ought to carry these weights, but if not, her dimensions would 
have to he enlarged as necessary. 
As regards miscellaneous features in her design, she would present 
the same general arrangements for stowage of boats, lead of fire mains, 
and absence of inflammable and splinterable material when possible to 
do without it, that were supposed to be characteristic of an ideal battle- 
ship, and she would, moreover, be sheathed and coppered. She would 
have light pole masts, and no fighting tops. For machinery, she would 
have water-tube boilers with economisers, and the ordinary type of triple- 
cspansion engines, driving either twin 01; treble screws, bu t  not doublc 
disconnecting sets of engines on cach shaft. 
- 
PART III.-SECOSD AND THIRD-CLASS CRUISERS. 
If money were no object, it might be better to build all 
our cruisers as ships of the first-class type. 3Ioney however is 
always a consideration, and as foreign cruisers vary gr:atly in size 
and design, it can best be espended in producing more than one class 
of ship. For the sum laid out in building such a vessel as the one 
just dealt with, two second-class and four, or even five, third-class cruisers 
could be turned out, all capable of meeting the similar classes existing 
in foreign Services, and, by the numerical increase &obtained, providing 
a better defence against them. T h e  difference in the types, however, is 
merely one of degree, for the same purposes must be kept in view in 
building them, and thcreforc the same general ideas should underly their 
designs. T h e  same requisites are called for in the same order of pre- 
cedence, but 'on a reduc3d scale. That  being so, it is not proposed 
to review the qualifications of a good cruiser and the arguments in favour 
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of these qualifications all over again, and  the types of smaller cruisers 
will be dealt with briefly and generally. 
I n  the writer‘s judgment a good second-class cruiser should be, like 
all our other ships, a good sea boat; she ought to have a speed of ;L 
least twenty-two knots under moderately favourable conditions, and a coa 
capacity sufficient to take her eight thousand miles at economical rates. 
Her  armament should comprise about ten G-inch quick-firers, supple- 
mented by 12-pounders and 1-pouQder Maxims. IIer protection 
should lie ‘in a good protective deck, a complete system of isolated 
shelter for her G-inch guns, either in the form of casemate or circular 
shields at least 5 inches thick in front, truncated funnel casings and 
supply hoists, and a c o y i n g  toiver. She could be fitted with a submerged 
torpedo-tube on each broadside, another one aft, and a ram. I n  all othcr 
general details and respects she would reseniblc a first-class cruiser on a 
smaller scale, and if possible should bc a vessel not exceeding six 
thousand tons displacement. 
For a third-class cruiser a vessel of two thousand tons displacement 
is advocated ; a good sea boat with a speed of about twenty-one knots, 
carrying two G-inch Q.P guns., mounted one forward and one aft, and a 
12-pounder battery of not less than six guns on each broadside. This 
the writer admits to bc a somewhat unusual type .of armament, but thinks 
that its adoption can be justified in the light of recent events. Thc  
execution wrought on the unprotected parts of even first-class cruisers by 
a hail of little G-pounder shells was a conspicuous. lesson of Cervera’s 
defeat. The  12-pounder throws, of course, a shell of just double the 
weight, and of more than double the destructive power; and, therefore, 
the writer holds that these guns are sufficiently powerful for the attack of 
vessels so lightly framed as third-class cruisers or gun-boats ; and on 
account of the much greater number which can be carried, a battery of 
such seems more suitable for this purpose, and likely to effect its work 
more quickly than a battery ‘of fetter but heavier guns,. such as 4- or 
4T-inch. The  12-pounder is, for its weight, a remarkably handy and 
hard-hitting weapon, with a very light and simple mounting for the sizc 
of the gun. I t  may be said if that is the case, why include G-inch guns 
in the armament of such a ship at al‘ 2 This has been considered 
necessary, because i t  would be possible for even a small sized enemy to 
carry without loss of speed suficient protection in a few parts to 
resist the bloivs of 12-lb. projectiles, but not those of 100-pounders, 
and she niust therefore always be vulnerable to the latter, even if she 
attempts to keep out the former. T h e  6-inch and 12-pounder guns 
of such a type of small craft ~vould correspond to the 1 2  inch and 
G-inch of a battle-ship on a small scale. I t  may also bc asked, why 
there should then be the exception to this general analogy which exists 
in the case of the first and second-class types of cruisers given, in which 
there is nothing to correspond to the 12-inch guns. The  writer’s 
reason for this is, that if foreign cruisers were to begin to carry 
armour too heavy-for the attack of G-inch projectiles, they could only do 
so at some sacrifice of speed, and IT 1ld be overstepping the line which 
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GOLD XEDAL PRIZE ESSAY. 391 
nivitles the battle-ship proper from the cruiser proper, by subordinating 
to defensive powcr-a proceeding which, as formerly remarked, h q  
been pointed out by such an authority as Captain illahan, to be one that 
can only arisc when the true mission of a cruiser is not kept in view. 
This type of third-class cruiser would carry enough coal to steam 
about two thousand milcs, but would not be sheathed, as the limited 
radius of action of these small vessels prevents them from undehaking 
\.cry long trips, and the docking facilities are much more numerous for 
thein than for the larger classes. They would, in fact, be mainly 
restricted to scouting work, and the protection of commerce in places 
\diere it is liable to the attacks of small craft. 
PART IV.-TORPEDO CRAFT AND DESTROYERS. 
In  the opinion of the writer, there is no distinct function in war for 
a vessel smaller than the third-class cruiser, until the class known as 
torpedo-boat destro1ers is descended to, and therefore no necessity for 
building them. I t  is true a few gun-boats and so-called “torpedo- 
cruisers ” do mist in foreign Navies, vesscls with displacements varying 
from three hundred to one thousand tons, but they are all so very 
lightly armed that in many cases a single destroyer of not much more 
than half their size could meet them on equal terms. Two dcstroycrs 
could in xiiric cases out of ten sink or  capture any of them. For use 
against torpedo-boats, the object with which the earlier ones were chiefly 
built, they are not nearly so eficacious as destroyers ; and the same thing 
may be generally remarked of them when used as torpedo craft thcni- 
sclves, or as scouts, with the one reservation in their favour that their 
5ize epahles them to stand very bad weather somewhat better, and gives 
them rather more coal stowage. As commerce-destroyers, they are too 
small for distant ocean work, and not potverfnl enough to do much on 
buch lines of traflic as run near their own coasts, even if the shipping on 
these routes has only destroyers to depend on for‘defence. 
No type of gon-boat or torpedo-gunboat will therefore be described 
in this essay, and torpedo-boat destroyers will next be dedlt with. 
I n  the writer’s view, a destroyer should have a displacement of not less 
than three hundred and fifty tons. A good sea boat can be built of that 
size with a real speed of thirty knots. T h e  next point to be considered hi 
her case should be her armament, and not, as in the.case of cruisers, her 
coal stowage. ‘The writer arrives at this conclusion by adhering consistently 
to the principle of keeping in view the object with which a ship is built. 
A torpedo-boat destroyer is primarily what her name denotes her to be, 
that is, a vessel esisting as an antidote to torpedozbbats. She may of 
course be appropriated for other purposes, and prove estrc-mely useful in 
many ways, but the torpedo-boat is her proper quarry. Next to the 
requisite speed, therefore, she ought to be provided with the armament 
that will best enable her to realise the object with which she was built. 
The 12-pounder gun mill answer the purpose very well as a rule, but any- 
one who has witnessed target practice from the gun Tiatform of a destroyer 
VOL. XLIV. 3 x 
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iiiust have been struck by the great dif1icuIt~- of making good shooting in 
a seaway, and it seems quite conceivable to thuvr i t e r  that 1-pounder 
Nasims migllt thcn at all events do better. \\‘hen there is an uninterrupted 
stream of bullets issuing from a gun, as in the case of allasim, the motion 
of a ship.is at least no disadvantage, possibly the reverse, for “number 
one” has only to get his direction on-the easiesE- thing in laying-and 
then the rapid rise and fall of the muzzle will aldost certainly ensure hits, 
whether the range is correct or not. 
ForthEarniament of the three-huntlred-and-fifty-ton destroyer then, the 
,writer would choose two 12-poundcrs, one forward and o h  aft, on central 
mountings ; and four 1-pounder 3Iazims mounted on the broadside ; 
the two foremost h s i n i s  ~vel l  forward, in a corresponding position to the 
foremost G-pounders as usually carried in tlestrojers, so as to have a good 
fire ahead for chasing. 
As regards coai, she should be capable of carrying about eighty tons, 
when she has a total displacement of three hulltired and fifty tons. This 
would provide her with the means of steaming for about eight or ten days 
at economical speeds, and about two a t  full. Nore cannot well be 
carried, as weights must at  all costs be kept down in such ships, or the 
very high speeds domandcd will be unattainable. For this reason, ‘110 
real protection of a concrete nature can be supplied either. Her protec- 
tion against more powerful ships must lie in her speed, and against her 
own class in.having better trained shots a t  her guns if possible. Neither 
can slie be constrticted stoutly enough for any thought oc ramming ; and 
except as a means of bringing her guns quickly to bear in various direc- 
tions when dealing with torpedo-boats good manauvring powers are of 
minor importance to her. . 
The torpedo-boat proper is too small to have many opportunities for 
executing her mission in-  our Xavy. She is essentially an implement of 
defensive warfare, because unable to work a t  any but very short distances 
from a base, or to remain at sea in even modrrately bad weather. She is 
therefore best suited to the requirements of the weaker maritime Powers, 
and can be of little use in a Service like our own, whose true field of 
operations is across the seas on the enemy’s coast-line, and whose ships 
must in consequence, as repeatedly urged, have above, all things the 
power to keep the sea in any weather. 
Occasions might present themselves, however, even then, in which a 
torpedo-boat would have her chance, as, for instance, against a ship 
endeavouring to break blockadt ; but as destroyers are invariably supplied 
with two or inore tubes, they should be capable of .performing tho 
torpedo-boat’s work themselves if caHed,.upgn in such cases to do so. 
?’hey are thus a formidable menace to big ships as well as to 
torpedo-boats, and should prove most valuable adjuncts to a blockading 
fleet. .The opportunities of using their torpedoes, however. lvould 
probably be comparatively. r irc ; and, bearing in mind the no!v well 
ascertained ;&of carrying unprotected \Vliiteheads under fire, the writer 
ventures the opinion that ‘one tube ~vould be sufficient. The  saving in 
\ve’i&it would enable them to stow a COL .dqablp increased al!,xvance of 
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>Iiisim aminunition-a very important point \vIieii it is rcmenibered that 
a fleet of fifteen-thousand-ton battle-ships may be relying on their poweh 
to keep off very dangerous assailants. 
The recent remarliable perfornianccs of the ‘‘ Turbinia,” the little 
craft propelled by steam turbines, have naturally escited very considerable 
interest. ‘This type of machinery is still in an esperimcntal stage, and  
suffers from the great, drawback of an escessivc cspenditrire of fuel ; but 
if this can be overcome, its application ought almost certainly to be 
extended to all classcs of small craft, and perhaps ultimately even to large 
ships, for it has many great advantages over the ordinary type of marine 
cngine. It has not as yet, however, quite established a reputation beyond 
dispute, and tlie writer, therefore, does not propose to advocate its use 
definitely herein, although holding to the opinion that it has shown 
suficient‘ promise to merit exhaustive espcrimcnt and attention. 
PART \‘.--J~ISCELLAXEOUS \‘ESSELS. 
In addition to all these various classes of ships, a fleet may be 
usefully accompanied b y  a workshop, or repairing-ship, especially 
if  employed away from a base. Thc,.Xmerican reports all speak 
highiy of the value of the vessel SJ employed by them, and attached 
to the Cuban blockading squadron. Such a ship could combine this 
object with the duty of a torpedo depGt-ship, similar to our own “\TuIcan.’’ 
T o  be really well fitted for her work! it would be necessaryfor her 10 have 
suflicient speed to remain with the fleet at‘ all times, partly that licr 
services might be available at any moment and partly for her own safety. 
Another kind of vessel which as yet can scarcely be said to esist, but 
which might prove‘an invaluable adjunct to a fleet in war, is a fast collier 
or store-ship, specially designed and supplied with all tlie best appliances 
for rapid loading and unloading, such as long hatches, travelling cranes, 
iron tip, buckets, ctc. \\‘it11 a suficient proportion of these vessels 
attached to his command, to carry reserve stores of coal and ammunition, 
an admiral could rennin independent of a base for comparatively cstcndcd 
periods, and conduct rapid or distant strategical movements with more  
ease from the increased mobility of his squadron. 
Had Dewey possessed a few, his position iiccd never have caused the 
extreme ansiety to his country which at  one time it did. 
Such vessels could carry out the ordinary woik of cargo steamers in 
time of peace, under subsidy perhaps from Government, to entitle the 
rcqiiisition of their services when needed. 
CONCLUDIXG RE3IARItS. 
\\’ith these remarks, then, this essny.nill be closed. In dealing with 
the subject the writer has consistently eiidcavoured to approach i t  from the 
naval oficer’s standpoint-or a t  least from what lie considers. as such- 
and not from that of the naval architect. The  object aimed at  has been a 
statement of  the requirements of the different tyy-s of vessels which go 
to compose a properly constituted fleet, based lipI ?\n consideration of 
3 A 2  
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394 GOLD MEDAL P K l Z E  ESShY. 
their various duties and guided by an unprejudiced investigation of the 
incidents and events of the two most recent maritime wars. No plans 
accompany the essay, no attempt has been made to propose exact details 
of dimensions or designs, and this has been intentionaj, on the principle 
that those steps must be left to the professional dcsignerynd builder after 
he  has received a clear idea of what is required. At the same time it has 
been sought to avoid the suggestion of anything manifestly impossible, and 
the  weights, sizes, speeds, etc., mentioned, are never in excess of what 
have already actually been produced in combination, in certain vessels 
now,afloat. As may be gathered from the  contents of the essay, the 
writer is very strongly impressed with the advantages of homogeneity both 
in ships and weapons. Five types of ships have been given, it is true, but 
the  division of the ciuiser class into three-the presently accepted 
custom-arises with sufficient reason from the estreme diversity of type 
prevalent in foreign Services, and the variety of a cruiser’s duties. Only 
one  class of battle-ship has been dealt with, ho\reser, on the theory that 
only one class should exist. Smaller battle-ships have their advocates, 
n o  doubt, and some strong arguments can be advanced in their favour ; 
but irhen all is said and done, there is no getting away from the unalterable 
fact, that the greatest developments in offensive and defensive powers are 
only to be obtained by submitting to equally great developments in weight, 
and great weights can only be carried at good speeds, or for long distances, 
bybig ships. I n  the matter of armaments, the varieties or calibre have been 
reduced to four, inclusive of every size carried in battleship, cruiser, or 
destroyer. The  patterns which go, in fact, to constitute the battle-ship’s 
complete armament, include the patterns used in all the other classes of 
vessels. This is a step towards homogeneity in the ,vessels tb-fnselves, 
for their armaments are a necessary part of them, and where homogeneity 
can be acquired without detracting from the individual excellencies of the 
different classes, it becomes in itself a characteristic feature of  the best 
types ; for a ship must be considered not merely in her separate entity, 
but as a unit in our fleet. 
._ 
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